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1. Introduction 
This paper is motivated by the ongoing debate among economists and policy makers 
about the efficiency and distributional effects of different methods and sequencing of 
privatizations around the world. Our goal is to evaluate what economists have learned to 
date about the economic effects of privatization, focusing on the experiences during the 
last 15-20 years in the post-communist (transition) economies and China, with 
comparative references to other developing countries.  
We focus on the transition economies because they provide a useful laboratory, 
having experienced major changes in the values of many relevant variables as they 
changed their economic system. Unlike most other developing countries and until 
recently also China, the transition economies for instance did not merely privatize a 
number of key state-owned firms or strive to improve the functioning of their legal and 
institutional framework. As may be seen from Table 1, they carried out a major 
transformation that made the share of private sector in GDP increase from extremely low 
levels (see e.g., Estrin, 1994) to between 60% and 90% (see EBRD, 2006) and they 
instituted from scratch a market-oriented legal and institutional system (see e.g., Svejnar, 
1991).1 The transition economies also differ from most other developing countries 
because of their relatively high level of human capital, initial lack of wealth in private 
domestic hands, and the heritage of anti-entrepreneurialism (see Estrin, Meyer, 
Bytchkova, 2006). However, they share with many other developing countries numerous 
characteristics associated with “weak” institutions, such as poorly conceived and/or 
ineffectively enforced property rights and insufficiently developed capital markets (see 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) for a discussion of the role of institutions in 
economic development). One can hence obtain valuable insights about the impact of 
privatization by focusing on the large literature dealing with the transition economies, 
while bringing in for comparison key findings obtained with respect to China and other 
developing countries. It is appropriate to undertake a study of this type now because it 
has been fifteen years or more since the start of transition and one may hence draw 
                                                 
1 However, because of their relatively low levels of development and the widespread use of “voucher 
privatization”, transition economies only generated 5% of the total global privatization proceeds between 
1990 and 2000.  The cumulative proceeds from privatization were estimated at $1.5 trillion in 2005 
(Megginson, 2005, p.21).  
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relatively robust empirical conclusions and address more rigorously than hitherto the 
issues of causality. 
Djankov and Murrell (2002) made a major attempt to survey this literature, applying a 
meta-analysis to the findings from a large number of diverse early studies, combining 
various indicators of performance (restructuring) into one composite measure. They 
found that privatization to outside owners resulted in 50 percent more restructuring than 
privatization to insiders (current managers or workers). Privatization to workers had no 
effect in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and a negative effect in the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) that replaced most of the former Soviet Union. Investment 
funds, foreigners and other block-holders were found to produce more than ten times as 
much restructuring as diffuse individual ownership. Hardening of budgets constraints (i.e. 
curtailing firms’ access to formal or informal state subsidies) was also found to have a 
positive effect on restructuring. Among other factors, import competition had a positive 
effect on performance in CEE, but a negative effect in CIS. Overall, the authors noted 
that the impact of privatization on company performance was typically positive and 
statistically significant in CEE, but statistically insignificant in CIS. They explained this 
by the more widespread occurrence of insider ownership after privatization and a weaker 
institutional environment leading to less effective governance by outside owners in the 
CIS countries. Finally, the authors noted that about one-half of the studies they surveyed 
did not take into account the endogeneity and selection issues associated with ownership 
and firm performance, and they urged future research to tackle this issue. 
The conclusions of Djankov and Murrell were echoed in Megginson (2005) that also 
surveyed the evidence on the impact of privatization in transition economies. He 
concluded that “mass” (or voucher) privatization, whereby ownership rights were 
distributed widely and at nominal prices, often led to disappointing outcomes, perhaps 
because this form of privatization was frequently associated with insider ownership. 
Companies where insiders gained control did poorly but firms with “real owners” 
(financial institutions, foreign corporations, or local entrepreneurs) were able to improve 
their performance. Megginson’s (2005) survey was complemented by a short survey by 
Guriev and Megginson (2006). Both studies related the mixed results on the impact of 
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privatization in transition economies to the slow progress in microeconomic and legal 
reform, especially in CIS countries. 
These surveys have not included much detail on China, perhaps because much of the 
private sector development has been either through foreign direct investment (FDI), entry 
de novo, or through unique Chinese ownership arrangements such as the township-village 
enterprises. However, since the mid-1990s, many large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 
China have been commercialized (made to operate as independent commercial entities) 
and shares in them have been sold; allowing private owners to obtain a majority stake or 
100% control. A substantial literature has emerged to study the effects of this 
privatization process.  
In the present study we report on a number of new results, while providing stronger 
supporting as well as contradictory evidence with respect to some of the previous 
research. We provide an assessment based on a number of important and 
methodologically strong new studies as well as earlier analyses and we distinguish 
studies on the basis of their sample size, econometric methodology and indicator of 
performance in order to draw conclusions that take these characteristics explicitly into 
account. Ownership structures have evolved, leading to changes in control over firms, 
and so the emphasis in the literature has to some extent shifted from insider versus 
outsider and concentrated versus dispersed ownership to domestic as against foreign 
owners. Broadly, we find that privatization to foreign owners raises efficiency relative to 
state owned firms, although in China this result is less clear cut and relatively more 
estimates suggest that private domestic ownership raises TFP. The effect of domestic 
private ownership is by and large also found positive in the CEE region and in Ukraine, 
but it is quantitatively much smaller than that of foreign ownership. Russia appears to be 
different in that the effect of domestic private and mixed ownership is found to be 
negative or insignificant. Evidence from a recent firm-level data set from 26 transition 
economies also suggests that there is an insignificant average (across countries) effect of 
domestic private ownership relative to that of the state ownership. Concentrated 
(especially foreign) private ownership has a stronger positive effect than dispersed 
ownership in CEE and CIS, but foreign joint ventures rather than wholly owned foreign 
firms have a positive effect on TFP level in China. Worker ownership in either CEE or 
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CIS (and collective ownership in China) does not seem to have a negative effect relative 
to other forms of private ownership. Finally, data from CEE and CIS suggest that new 
firms appear to be equally or more productively efficient than firms privatized to 
domestic owners, and foreign start-ups appear to be more efficient than domestic ones.  
Turning to other measures of performance, studies of labor productivity find that 
private ownership has a positive or insignificant effect on labor productivity (not 
controlling for non-labor inputs) in CEE and CIS, and a mostly insignificant effect in 
China. In terms of profitability, in CEE, CIS and China the effect of private foreign and 
domestic ownership on profitability is found to be positive or statistically insignificant, 
with the significance depending on the particular type of ownership. Concentrated 
domestic private ownership, managerial ownership, and to a lesser extent foreign 
ownership generally tend to have a positive effect on profitability, while evidence from 
CEE also suggests that profitability is unaffected when the state keeps a golden share or 
workers wield more concentrated ownership. Studies of CEE and CIS countries indicate 
that privatization tends to have a positive effect on the scale of operation (sales revenues), 
while studies of the effect of private ownership on the rate of change of scale of 
operations (from CEE, CIS and China) suggest that this effect is generally not statistically 
significant.  
Regarding indicators of labor market performance, studies of employment find that 
privatization in the post-communist economies and China is not associated with a 
reduction in employment, a finding that goes counter to many theoretical models, as well 
as evidence from some developing countries (e.g., Mexico). On the contrary, private 
owners tend to keep employment at higher levels than SOEs, ceteris paribus. Studies of 
the effects of ownership on wages find that state ownership is associated with lower 
wages in some countries, such as Russia and former Czechoslovakia, but not in others, 
such as Poland. Results from the Czech Republic suggest that there is no significant 
difference in the rate of return on an additional year of education between state-owned, 
privatized and newly established private firms, but that private firms reward university 
education more than SOEs. In Russia, where in the 1990s firms tended to owe wages to 
their workers, SOEs were more likely to exhibit wage arrears than other types of firms. 
Many studies examined the effect of privatization on other indicators and while the broad 
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range of indicators precludes a simple summary, the results exhibit a pattern that is in line 
with the above measures of performance. We provide a more detailed exposition of these 
findings and our interpretation of them in the remainder of this paper. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the experience of 
privatization in the transition economies and more generally around the world, as well as 
the economic effects of privatization and the principal methodological and data issues 
encountered in the literature. We also outline the key systemic changes and policies that, 
along with privatization, were advocated and in part or fully carried out during the 
transition. In sections 3 and 4, we examine the macro- and micro-economic evidence 
about the determinants, extent and impact of privatization, and we survey and evaluate 
the existing literature and attempt to develop a coherent picture of how and why 
privatization has affected national and enterprise economic performance in the transition 
economies and China. We conclude our study in Section 5 with policy-oriented 
observations. 
 
2. Policies, Institutions, and Privatization 
While the wisdom and economic effects of privatization in CEE and CIS is currently the 
subject of intense re-examination, in the early 1990s privatization was widely considered 
one of the keystones of the entire transition process. The policy arguments were based 
upon a theoretical foundation (see e.g. Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Bos, 1991) and 
successful experience in developed economies, notably the United Kingdom (see Bishop 
and Kay, 1988; Vining and Boardman, 1992). Overall, the findings from studies of 
developed and middle-income countries, surveyed by Megginson and Netter (2001), 
indicate that privatization could be expected to improve enterprise efficiency and 
profitability. The view that privatization could also be pivotal in the transition process 
was especially strongly advocated by proponents of the so called Washington Consensus, 
which emphasized fast transfer of ownership via privatization and belief that private 
ownership together with market forces would ensure better and more efficient 
performance of the economy (see e.g. Lipton and Sachs, 1990, and Blanchard, 
Dornbusch, Krugman, Layard, and Summers, 1991). Combined with price liberalization, 
freedom from state control was seen as the way to bring prices into line with opportunity 
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costs and to harden budget constraints (see Kornai, 1990). In fact, efficiency was one of 
the important arguments for privatization as the transfer of ownership rights was seen as 
being crucial for the efficient allocation of resources and long term economic growth. 
From a political perspective, advocated for instance by Andrei Shleifer, privatization was 
viewed as necessary even if there were to be no efficiency improvements. This is because 
from this perspective the principal reason for privatization was to eradicate the command 
economic system rooted in communist ideology, of which state ownership was the 
backbone. As e.g. Shleifer and Treisman (2005) show, privatization was very successful 
from the political point of view almost from the outset, but most of the empirical work 
concentrates on efficiency gains. Hence we survey the efficiency related arguments in the 
first sub-section below. 
From the start it was argued that, even from the  perspective of enhancing enterprise 
efficiency alone, privatization on its own would not be sufficient for an effective 
functioning of emerging market economies. Most of the early writers on the subject of 
optimal strategy of the transition formulated a series of interrelated systemic changes and 
policy reforms that were a prerequisite for successful transition (Svejnar, 1989; Lipton 
and Sachs, 1990; Blanchard, Dornbusch, Krugman, Layard, and Summers, 1991; Aghion 
and Blanchard, 1994). Since the impact of privatization was often viewed as being 
dependent on the presence of other accompanying policies and systemic changes, we 
briefly evaluate these in the second sub-section below. 
Previous surveys highlight two further issues that are likely to influence the character 
of the privatization process, and its impact on enterprise and national economic 
performance. The vast extent of privatization in the transition economies, relative to 
anything that had ever been attempted before, spawned considerable variation in 
privatization methods within as well as between countries. It was suggested at the time 
that “bad privatization methods”, for example so-called “mass privatization” in which 
ownership rights were dispersed widely at nominal prices, may have led to “bad 
ownership structures” and therefore reduced the potential gains from privatization. We 
consider privatization methods in the third sub-section, before turning to a critical aspect 
of institutional development, the capital market, by examining the relationship between 
privatization and stock market development in the fourth. 
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2.1 What Were the Reasons for Privatization? 
The fall of centrally planned economic system and privatization on a global scale 
represent a complete reversal of the long-term efforts in the 19th and 20th centuries to 
impose either strong regulatory controls on markets or to replace markets with planning 
and state control. Historically state-owned enterprises were established in both the 
socialist and capitalist countries to ensure political control of production, better provision 
of public goods, more effective ways of dealing with externalities, spearheading of 
economic development in the absence of “well functioning” markets, and guaranteeing 
full employment and equitable income distribution. But the economic performance of 
many SOEs proved disappointing and since the early 1980s privatization started to be 
advocated as a means of establishing clear property rights, providing economic incentives 
and stimulating superior economic performance of firms and economies at large (Vickers 
and Yarrow, 1988). One argument for privatization stresses the different objectives and 
corporate governance of SOEs and privately owned firms. The objective imposed by the 
owner in SOEs is not necessarily consistent with conventionally defined efficiency. For 
example, SOEs may be required to deviate from profit maximization or cost 
minimization in order to satisfy political objectives, by creating or maintaining 
employment in economically depressed regions or by holding prices below average costs 
for redistributive reasons (see e.g., Estrin and Perotin, 1991). The politicization of 
enterprise decision-making may also open firms up to lobbying and unproductive rent 
seeking (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1994, 1997). 
Even if the state decides to maximize the profits of the firms that it owns, problems of 
corporate governance may still generate inferior performance in SOEs as compared to 
privately owned firms. Outside owners – whether private or state – do not have full 
access to the information about corporate performance that is concentrated in the hands 
of managers and when ownership and control are separated, firm-specific rents may be 
used to satisfy manager’s private ambitions (Berle and Means, 1932). However, a private 
ownership system places some constraints on managers’ discretionary behavior -- both 
external constraints imposed by product and capital markets and internal constraints, 
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imposed via statutes, and it is often assumed that it is almost impossible for the state as 
owner to replicate these constraints. 
In most developed economies, the constraints on managerial discretion are usually 
external to the firm and derive from capital markets, which could but often do not have 
the same effects on SOEs. The quality of managerial decision-making is an input in the 
choices of traders in equity markets, whose judgment on company performance is 
captured in the share price. If the managerial team is thought to be inefficient, the share 
prices will be reduced, putting pressure on managers to improve their performance, 
ultimately via the market for corporate control. Firms that are perceived as performing 
poorly can be subject to hostile take-over bids. The effectiveness of this mechanism 
depends however on capital market development and the concentration of share 
ownership. If holdings are widely dispersed, owners may face a free rider problem in 
which the individual returns to monitoring by each owner are less than the costs (see 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This implies that the superiority of private ownership after 
privatization may depend on the degree of ownership concentration. Similarly, it has been 
hypothesized that privatization methods that distribute the private ownership rights to 
workers, so that ownership holdings are highly dispersed and the objectives of the new 
owners are not necessarily the maximization of profit, may also fail to generate superior 
governance and company performance (see Earle and Estrin, 1996 for a survey). 
The mechanisms to align the incentives of managers and owners in privately owned 
firms may also operate through managerial shareholding and bonus payments (see 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), or as in the case of Japan or Germany, through 
internal constraints, with ownership beings typically highly concentrated into the hands 
of banks, funds or families who are granted board representation and undertake close 
monitoring of enterprise performance directly (see Franks and Mayer, 2001). 
The argument for privatization is based on the notion that SOEs are often not subject 
to private capital market and managerial labor market discipline, and in these 
circumstances neither the competitively driven informational structure nor the market 
based governance mechanisms such as the market for corporate control can be substituted 
for in full. Moreover, although the government’s ownership stake is concentrated, the 
state is in many cases not directly represented on the boards of public sector companies.  
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In many developing economies as well as in some developed countries, family and 
business group ownership remains predominant, and though the ownership structures are 
typically highly concentrated, this ownership form is usually argued to impair company 
performance relative to outsider ownership structures (see Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung, 
2005). Privatization in some transition economies, especially in the former Soviet Union, 
has led to the emergence of diversified business groups owned by an individual or family 
(“oligarchs”), but the evidence suggests that they may be more efficient that other 
privatized companies (see Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005, and Gorodnichenko and 
Grygorenko, 2005). 
The above arguments about the benefits of private over state ownership have had 
particular resonance in Central and Eastern Europe, where the failure of the socialist 
system was closely associated with state ownership and planning (see Gregory and 
Stuart, 2003). In the early phase of the transition, the weak monitoring of managers by 
the state as owner and the absence of external constraints gave management almost total 
discretion in state owned firms to follow their own objectives – rent absorption, asset 
stripping, employment, social targets – but rarely in pursuit of profits, cost reduction or 
innovation. The governance problems were exacerbated by the incentive problems caused 
by the softness of budget constraints (see Kornai, 1990, Dewatripont, Maskin and 
Roland, 2000; Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 2003), with poorly performing firms often 
having easier access to external investment funds than the better performing ones (Lizal 
and Svejnar, 2002). Moreover, Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (2000) have 
argued that the imposition of hard budget constraints on SOEs will not induce revenue 
restructuring because entrepreneurial incentives associated with outside investor will still 
be absent. This relates to the incomplete contracts ideas of Hart and Moore that have been 
used to argue that state managers tend to make routine decisions whereas private owners 
would engage in non-routine decisions and stimulate entrepreneurship. In the presence of 
external shocks, privatized firms are hence thought to move more readily into new 
markets and product lines and hence be less likely to lay off workers than SOEs. This 
suggests that privatization might only be effective when control shifts to new owners, 
who are thereby able to change the managers. Barberis et al (1996) find efficiency gains 
deriving from new owners. As we discuss below, delayed privatization can also 
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undermine the performance of the SOEs, since in this situation the incentives of 
managers become to seize assets rather than improve performance. 
There were of course numerous caveats to the arguments in support of private 
ownership (see Bos, 1991) and these may explain some of our empirical findings below. 
Laffont and Tirole (1991) noted some of the welfare dilemmas when private firms 
provided public goods and/or had natural monopoly power. If firms have monopoly 
power, then privatizations can be harmful even if the productive efficiency of a firm 
increases, unless there are adequate regulatory controls or sufficiently rapid entry (see 
also Glaeser and Scheinkman, 1996). Monopoly power also creates a dilemma for the 
state as owner in a privatization process; firms which are privatized with monopoly 
power can be sold for higher prices than if the company is broken up to create a more 
competitive market structure (Estrin, 1994). Similarly, if corporate governance provisions 
for private firms are lax, company assets can be stolen and misallocated. The interaction 
of privatization and capital markets can be important, with privatized firms potentially 
drawing capital away from more productive new entrants if the lemons problem is more 
severe for the new entrants. Privatized firms with poor governance can undermine 
confidence in the financial market, thus reducing the use of these markets. One can 
hypothesize however that foreign-owned firms should face fewer of these problems, since 
their governance is set by their parent companies and subject to foreign regulations, while 
their resources are generally provided and monitored by their parent companies.2 
 
2.2 Policies in Transition Economies  
Privatization in the transition economies occurred in the context of broader systemic 
change and this sets the institutional and policy context for an evaluation of its impact. 
Thus, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, policy makers formulated initial reform 
strategies that focused on macroeconomic stabilization and microeconomic restructuring, 
along with supporting institutional and political change. Implementation varied across 
countries in both speed and the specifics of what occurred. Almost all transition 
governments plunged ahead, often in rapid big bang style, with what Svejnar (2002a) 
                                                 
2 The importance of corporate governance from a broader perspective of “participation” has been addressed 
by Jones (2004). 
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calls Type I reforms, namely macro stabilization, price liberalization and dismantling of 
the institutions of the communist system. The macroeconomic strategy emphasized 
restrictive fiscal and monetary policies; wage controls and in most cases also a fixed 
exchange rate. The micro strategy entailed moving quickly towards price liberalization 
for most goods, though usually not energy or housing. Most countries opened up rapidly 
to international trade, thus inducing a more efficient allocation of resources based on 
world market prices, and quickly reduced direct subsidies to SOEs. Finally, they 
introduced of some elements of a social safety net in order to make citizens be more 
willing to accept the disruptions associated with the introduction of a market economy.  
Svejnar’s Type II reforms involved the development and enforcement of laws, 
regulations and institutions that would ensure a successful functioning of a market-
oriented economy. These reforms included the privatization of large and medium-sized 
enterprises, but also the establishment and enforcement of a market-oriented legal system 
and accompanying institutions, further development of a viable commercial banking 
sector and the appropriate regulatory infrastructure, labor market regulations, and 
parameters and institutions related to the unemployment, social security and retirement 
system. It was seen as important to develop and enforce a market oriented legal 
framework that would establish a level playing field, create well-defined property rights, 
permit the enforcement of contracts, and limit corruption. Given the central role of 
property rights in ensuring effective corporate governance in privately owned firms, the 
institutional framework was likely to be of particular relevance in determining the impact 
of privatization. 
According to the EBRD’s Transition Indicators (EBRD Transition Report, various 
years) progress in developing a market-supporting legal system was everywhere slow, 
although greater progress in limiting corruption and in establishing a functioning legal 
framework and institutions has been made in the central European and Baltic countries. 
In recent years, an important impetus for carrying out legal and institutional reforms in 
many of these countries has been the need to develop a system that conforms to that of 
the European Union (EU) as a prerequisite for accession (Baldwin, Francois, and Portes, 
1997). In the empirical work which follows, differences in institutions and policies can be 
proxied by country and time specific fixed effects, or their impact inferred by comparing 
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country specific studies, for example EU Accession countries versus those of the former 
Soviet Union. 
 
2.3 Privatization Methods 
Privatization was undertaken using a large variety of methods, and the literature has 
suggested that these may have influenced the effects on company performance. The need 
for large scale privatization was recognized from the outset with reasons ranging from 
perceived gains in economic efficiency, to increases in government revenues, to political 
appeal (Svejnar, 1989, Lipton and Sachs, 1990, Gupta, Ham, and Svejnar, 2000). The 
principal question for policy makers centered on the speed of its conduct. The arguments 
for fast privatization were that (a) price liberalization and other reforms would not 
provide sufficient incentives for SOEs to restructure and become competitive, (b) state 
would not be able to resist intervening in SOEs (Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1991; 
Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995) and (c) managers would decapitalize firms in the 
absence of rapid clarification of property rights (Frydman, Phelps, Rapaczynski and 
Shleifer, 1993; Blanchard, Dornbusch, Krugman, Layard, and Summers, 1991). In 
contrast, Dewatripont and Roland (1992a,b) and Roland (1994) argued that gradual 
privatization was needed because the political backlash to rapid privatization of all firms 
would be unacceptable. In particular, Dewatripont and Roland’s (1992a,b) argument for 
gradualism was that it allowed the government to pursue a strategy that necessitated 
fewer workers/voters being immediately laid off and that it would reduce uncertainty. As 
we discuss below, however, empirical evidence shows that in most countries privatization 
did not bring about a reduction in employment. 
In approaching the practical aspect of privatization, in addition to the political 
economy issues noted above, there was a major concern that managers could seize state 
property and claim it as their own through the so called popular privatization as occurred 
early on in Hungary and to some extent the other Central European economies (Svejnar, 
1989, Lipton and Sachs, 1990). Some also feared that workers would claim ownership of 
their firms (Hinds, 1990, Lipton and Sachs, 1990), although this fear was probably 
exaggerated (Prasnikar and Svejnar, 1991, Ellerman, 1993, Earle and Estrin, 1996). 
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In practice, the stock of domestic private savings in these countries was too small to 
purchase the assets being offered and foreign direct investment (FDI) had rarely been 
available on the scale required (Estrin, 1994). This led governments to innovate with 
privatization methods. Thus, though for selected firms auction or public tender methods 
were used, many countries also experimented with free distribution methods. So-called 
"mass” privatization entailed placing into private hands vouchers of a value sufficient to 
purchase those state assets to be privatized. 
Virtually all privatization strategies facilitated a rapid change in ownership structure 
in most transition economies. With the exceptions of Hungary and Poland, few countries 
had contained a private sector of any significance in 1990 (Table 1). But as early as 1995, 
the private sector share was already at or above 50 percent in ten countries (five countries 
in Central Europe, three Baltic countries, Bulgaria, and Russia), though in eight former 
republics of the Soviet Union, it remained below 30%. By 2006, the private sector in 
thirteen additional nations had reached above 55 percent of GDP, it reached 45% in 
Uzbekistan, and only two laggards, Belarus and Turkmenistan, still had private sector 
activity below 25 percent of GDP. 
This remarkable performance should not conceal real concerns about quality of 
privatization, and therefore about its consequences for subsequent private sector 
performance. For example, though retained state shareholdings were small in some of the 
leading transition economies, the state continued to own significant shareholdings in 
many others. Thus, the Russian state retained more than a 20 percent share in 37 percent 
of privatized firms, and only sold a 100% share in half of them. (Earle and Estrin, 1997). 
In a 1999 survey of privatized firms, EBRD found that in 20 of the 23 countries, the state 
had retained some shares in around 20% of privatized firms, with more than a 20 percent 
shareholding in around 12 percent of the firms. The state kept a share of more than 15 
percent of privatized firms in eight countries and more than 30 percent in a further four. 
Retained state ownership has also been a major factor in Chinese privatizations (Tian and 
Estrin, 2005). Governments have also used golden shares to maintain significant 
influence over the privatized SOEs.  
Mass privatization was also argued to hinder the establishment of effective corporate 
governance, especially if long "agency chains" were created (Stiglitz, 2002). Voucher 
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privatization led to ownership structures that were highly dispersed because the entire 
adult population of the country, or all insiders to each firm, was allocated vouchers with 
which to purchase the shares of the company. In many countries mass privatization also 
initially resulted in majority ownership by insiders. According to Earle and Estrin (1997), 
in Russia insiders held a majority shareholding in 75 percent of firms and outsiders in 
only 9 percent immediately after privatization in 1994. Estrin and Wright (1999) show 
this pattern of extensive insider ownership is also consistent with the evidence for other 
CIS countries. For example, in Ukraine, insiders owned 51 percent of shares in all 
privatized firms in 1997, while outsiders held 38 percent and the state held the rest (Estrin 
and Rosevear, 1999). Insider ownership was predominantly in the hands of workers. 
However, this probably created limited problems for management because worker 
ownership was highly dispersed. Indeed Blasi, Kroumova and Kruse (1997) argue that in 
Russian employee-owned firms control was effectively in the hands of management. 
However, ownership structures rapidly evolved in favor of outsider ownership, even 
in the former Soviet Union (Estrin and Wright, 1999). The literature (e.g. Djankov and 
Murrell, 2002) would lead us to expect that the method of privatization would also affect the 
impact of privatization on company performance but this evolution of ownership structures 
in most transition economies, associated with the development of capital markets, suggests 
that these initial effects might not be sustained into the longer term. We consider the 
developments of capital markets below and explore the issue in the empirical sections. 
 
2.4 Privatization and Capital Markets 
The literature suggests that there will be a relationship between stock market 
development, privatization and post-privatization performance in transition countries. 
However, in fact this has not yet been well established. Empirical studies by King and 
Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), Rousseau and Wachtel (2000), Beck and 
Levine (2004), and Rajan and Zingales (2003) provide evidence of a positive correlation 
between stock market development and economic growth in developed as well as 
emerging markets. In the early stages of their transformation, the transition economies 
also needed large amounts of capital for their restructuring and the financial sector was 
weak with banks undercapitalized. The majority of companies were unable to generate 
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profits large enough to finance the necessary restructuring through retained earnings, a 
situation which would call for a great deal of reliance on equity financing, to which 
privatization was intended to provide access. 
However, though development of the capital market in transition countries was partly 
shaped by privatization programs, privatization methods were rarely driven by the 
objective of developing the capital market. For example, direct sales of state assets do not 
affect stock markets at the time of sale since the shares do not enter the market.3 On other 
hand, privatizing state assets through the stock market provides liquidity and enhances 
transparency. As a consequence of the mass privatization programs, large numbers of 
shares were put on the market without reference to listing requirements.4 
Stock markets transition economies during the 1990s were often characterized by 
insufficient regulation, institutional fragility and weak minority shareholder protection 
(EBRD 1998; Bonin and Wachtel, 2003).Yet the literature has rarely considered the 
connection between the privatization method employed and the consequent functioning 
of the capital market.5 Not only does the success of certain privatization methods depend 
on the existence of a capital market, but as we have seen the methods also determine the 
post-privatization ownership structure as further trading of shares evolves. The inter-
relationship between privatization and capital market development has been analyzed by 
Fungacova and Hanousek (2006). They use data over the period 1990-2003 from the 
majority of transition economies to test whether and in what ways privatization has 
influenced capital market development. They show that while market capitalization to 
GDP increased suddenly following mass privatization, most of these new shares were 
traded only occasionally or not at all, and this illiquidity became more pronounced over 
time. In countries which used mass privatization, the capital market did not initially fulfill 
its function of providing capital resources to enterprises. 
                                                 
3 Later on, when privatized companies grow, they may use the stock market as sources of capital.  
4 Though motivated in part by the desire to develop the market, these policies may have had the opposite 
effect, as witnessed by massive delisting of companies for the stock exchange in countries such as the 
Czech Republic. 
5 Claessens, Djankov, and Klingebiel (2000) is one of the first studies recognizing the importance of 
institutions and law for stock market development. It was followed by several papers (Bonin and Wachtel, 
2003; Claessens, Lee, and Zechner, 2003; Berglof and Bolton, 2004) which relied heavily on its findings. 
The influence of capital market development on growth has been addressed in Bennett, Estrin, and Urga 
(2007), who do not identify a significant relationship. 
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Despite this unpromising beginning, development of the main stock indices in the 
transition economies has recently begun to show improvement. This is in part because the 
main listed companies on these markets have in recent years been the target of 
developing domestic pension funds, as well as investors from developed economies. 
Capital market evolution has also influenced ownership structure. While some of the 
studies discussed below specifically control for capital market development, this 
important issue is usually conflated with broader institutional development and with 
privatization methods. 
 
3. Determinants, Extent and Effects of Privatization 
In this section we discuss the principal hypotheses and results of corresponding empirical 
tests with respect to (a) the determinants and sequencing of privatizations and (b) the 
effect of privatization on economic performance at both the national and enterprise level. 
The sequencing issue is of importance in understanding the issues of selection and 
endogeneity which affect studies evaluating the impact of privatization on company 
performance. 
3.1 The Determinants, Sequencing and Extent of Privatization 
The number of studies examining the determinants, sequencing and extent of 
privatization, whether in developing or developed countries, is relatively limited. Gupta, 
Ham and Svejnar (2000) examine theoretically and empirically the determinants of the 
sequencing of privatization. They note that an important fact that stands out in all large-
scale privatizations is that no government has privatized all SOEs simultaneously. Even 
in countries that strove to privatize rapidly, (e.g., the Czech Republic, Estonia, Russia, 
Slovakia, and the Ukraine), the process consisted of a sequence of moves, with some 
firms being privatized earlier than others. The authors point out that government may 
sequence privatization of SOEs because (a) it may incur excessively high transaction and 
congestion costs if it tries to privatize all firms simultaneously, (b) it wants to reveal 
information about the firms to investors (later buyers may observe the quality of the firms 
sold earlier) if there is uncertainty about the quality of the firms being privatized, (c) it 
wants to avoid political opposition to dramatic reforms and possibly increase the 
 17
feasibility of future reforms (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995), and (d) it wants to avoid 
costly unemployment (Aghion and Blanchard, 1994, and Katz and Owen, 1993).6 
Given that governments privatize sequentially, the question arises as to which firms 
they choose to privatize first. A number of models have been developed to capture 
alternative government objectives that yield predictions about the government’s 
sequencing strategy (see Gupta, Ham and Svejnar, 2000). Glaeser and Scheinkman 
(1996) for instance examine sequencing strategies that would increase efficiency and 
argue that a primary advantage of private ownership is that it enhances efficiency by 
improving firms’ acquisition of, and responsiveness to, information. In their model 
private firms respond to demand and cost shocks, but this information is unobserved or 
ignored by public firms. In particular, the authors assume that private firms (unlike 
SOEs) observe the actual values and adjust their production when demand and cost 
conditions change. Thus if the government is concerned about increasing efficiency in 
this sense, the Glaeser-Scheinkman model predicts that privatization should begin where 
demand or cost volatility is the greatest and where it maximizes the flow of information. 
Thus when demand uncertainty is greater than cost uncertainty, the authors argue that 
downstream firms should be privatized before upstream firms because downstream firms 
are better positioned to transmit information between the retail and upstream sectors. 
Glaeser and Scheinkman (1996) also note that the informational gains from privatization 
may be offset by a loss of consumer surplus if firms with significant market power are 
privatized and allowed to engage in monopoly pricing. 
Gupta, Ham and Svejnar (2000) examine theoretically and empirically the following 
competing government objectives: i) maximizing Pareto efficiency through resource 
allocation; ii) maximizing public goodwill from the free transfers of shares to the public; 
iii) minimizing political costs stemming from unemployment; iv) maximizing efficiency 
through information gains (Glaeser-Scheinkman) and v) maximizing privatization 
revenues. They use firm-level data from the Czech Republic to test the competing 
theoretical predictions about the sequencing of privatization and find strong evidence that 
the government privatized first firms that were more profitable, firms in downstream 
                                                 
6 See Gupta, Ham, and Svejnar (2000) for sequencing of privatization and Roland (2000) for sequencing of 
reforms.  
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industries, and firms in industries subject to greater demand uncertainty. Privatizing more 
profitable firms first is inconsistent with maximizing Pareto efficiency but it is consistent 
with the model of maximizing privatization revenues, maximizing public goodwill and 
minimizing the political cost of unemployment. However, the implication of the political 
cost model that employment growth in the firm’s industry should affect sequencing is not 
supported by the results. Gupta, Ham and Svejnar’s (2000) finding that firms in 
downstream industries and in industries with greater demand uncertainty were more 
likely to be privatized early suggests that the government placed emphasis on efficiency 
in the Glaeser and Scheinkman (1996) sense, namely by privatizing first firms that 
required flexible management. However, in contrast to the Glaeser and Scheinkman’s 
recommendation, but consistent with the general evidence regarding profitability, firms 
with higher market share were more likely to be privatized first. 
Privatization, by divesting the state of key productive assets, is an unavoidably 
political process. Political configurations can influence the pace and timing of 
privatization, as was found by Bortolotti and Pinotti (2003) in their study of 21 OECD 
countries over the period 1977-2002. In particular, the authors found that political 
fragmentation gave several groups the opportunity to veto or otherwise block large-scale 
privatization, and hence delay or even halt the process. Politics also played a part in 
influencing privatization methods, with governments seeking popular support often 
favoring methods that dispersed share ownership. 
Politics can also influence the privatization method by requiring the government to 
retain significant ownership stakes post-privatization. Depending on the extent of such 
stakes, in effect ownership is transferred without (full) control. Bortolotti and Faccio 
(2004) studied this phenomenon of retained state ownership stakes by examining the 
evolution of control structures in 141 privatized firms in OECD countries. They found 
that in 2000, governments were the largest stakeholder or held special control powers 
(e.g. a golden share) in 62.4% of these privatized firms. Contrary to what one might have 
expected, however, they found no evidence that these government stakes adversely 
affected either firms’ performance or their market valuations. 
Overall, the theoretical models and hypotheses about determinants and sequencing of 
privatization, and Gupta, Ham and Svejnar’s (2000) econometric evidence, suggest that 
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firms are not assigned for privatization at random. This in turn implies that studies that 
treat the allocation of firms for privatization as random or do not adequately control for 
the non-random selection are likely to overstate the positive effect of privatization on 
performance. Djankov and Murrell’s (2002) survey for instance indicates that 47 percent 
of pre-2003 studies analyzing the impact of privatization on firm performance in the 
transition economies suffer from this problem. Realizing this shortcoming, Gupta, Ham 
and Svejnar (2000) analyze the problem that arises in the studies that ignore the fact that 
better firms may be privatized first and they show that even one of the most popular 
methods for controlling for selection or endogeneity in the existing studies, namely a 
difference-in-difference estimation (equivalent to fixed effects) approach, is unlikely 
fully to address this problem.7 Hence at least one-half and possibly a vast majority of the 
entire literature on privatization suffer from a problem of potential selection 
(endogeneity) bias. The general understanding of the effects of privatization and the 
ongoing policy work may hence be based on flawed information, a point that we illustrate 
in the empirical section of this paper. 
In addition to sequencing, there are a number of competing theoretical models of the 
desirable extent of privatization. Fershtman (1990) analyzed the interdependence between 
the ownership status and market structure. He examined a duopolistic market, considered 
the implications of privatization on the attractiveness of entry, the possibility of deterring 
entry, and the incumbent’s position as a natural monopoly. He demonstrated that a partly 
state-owned firm might realize higher profits than its private, profit-maximizing, 
competitor.8 This implies that partial rather than full privatization may be desirable in the 
conditions of imperfect competition, which is a feature of the early transition stage. 
McFaul (1995) reviews early transition events in Russia and argues that future 
progress in developing private property rights will require not only sound economic 
policies but also more robust state institutions. Based on this exercise, he claims that the 
set of political institutions comprising the first post-communist Russian state was not 
                                                 
7 Corporate performance is a function of firm’s ownership. Expected performance of a firm on other hand 
determines potential ownership structure. As there is a two-way relationship, difference-in-differences 
approach may be unable to account for endogeneity. 
8 This result is to certain extent supported by Hanousek, Kočenda and Svejnar (2007) who study 
performance of privatized firms and provide results that portray the state as a more economically and 
socially beneficial agent than other recent studies. 
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capable of either dismantling Soviet institutions governing property rights or creating or 
supporting new market-based economic institutions regarding private property. The 
conclusion based on his work is that the extent of privatization ought to be limited. 
Leamer and Taylor (1994) develop a Bayesian pooling technique to estimate 
aggregate production functions for the previously centrally planned economies of Eastern 
Europe and for Western economies, as well as for a group of developing countries. This 
technique adjusts for the low quality of the data from planned economies and also 
possible differences between centrally planned, Western and developing country 
technologies. The authors find that if the transferability of assets to the new technology is 
low and Western capital is unavailable, it may be better not to privatize than to have full 
(big-bang) privatization. Large-scale privatization is also less desirable if Western capital 
is available for new projects. Thus, in some instances it may be desirable to use Western 
support to slow the rate of privatization rather than hasten it. This study predicts that 
large scale privatization may be more desirable in the CEE countries than the CIS ones 
because western capital is at least initially more available for the former than the latter. 
3.2 Privatization, Growth and Other Aggregate Outcomes 
A number of theoretical models provided competing predictions about the effects of 
privatization on macro-economic performance and growth, with some envisioning the 
effect being positive, some negative and some ambiguous. In Gylfason (1998), 
privatization is shown to increase national economic output in a two-sector full-
employment general-equilibrium model by enhancing efficiency as if a relative price 
distortion were being removed through price reform, trade liberalization, or stabilization. 
Gylfason shows that the static output gain from privatization may be large and the 
potential dynamic output gain from privatization also appears to be substantial. Hansen 
(1997) uses a general equilibrium imperfect competition model to show that a broad 
distribution of ownership rights can have favorable influence on micro-economic 
efficiency and may therefore lead to a 'good' aggregate outcome. Sales to single or core 
investors, if accompanied by workers' equity shares, may perform worse. Furthermore 
only a so called Big Bang rapid approach to privatization might lead to favorable 
outcomes. 
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Several studies use aggregate data to assess the effect of privatization on economic 
performance. Using data from thirty five developing market economies over the 1988-
1992 period and employing Probit and Tobit models to identify the determinants of 
successful privatization programs, Plane (1997) finds that privatization (through 
divestiture) has a significant positive effect on economic growth and that the effect is 
stronger when privatization takes place in industry or infrastructure rather than in other 
sectors. This study hence considers sector of the firm (infrastructure, industry, and 
services) as the determinant of privatization while also including variables to control for 
macroeconomic development (prices, exchange rate, current account). It suggests that if 
economic performance is the goal of the government, privatization should occur in 
industry and infrastructure first. 
Berkowitz and De Jong (2001) analyze whether regional differences in reform 
policies in Russia can account for regional differences in growth rates and conclude that 
to a considerable degree they can. The authors find that regions with more large-scale 
privatization exhibit greater formation of new (legally registered) enterprises, which in 
turn exhibits a strong positive correspondence with growth. 
Privatization and economic growth may also be related through fiscal performance. 
Barnett (2000) uses macroeconomic and privatization data from 18 countries to find that 
privatization proceeds transferred to the budget tend to be saved and used to reduce 
domestic financing. His other main finding is that total privatization, as opposed to just 
the proceeds transferred to the budget, is correlated with an improvement in 
macroeconomic performance as manifested by higher real GDP growth and lower 
unemployment. However, this result needs to be interpreted cautiously as the evidence is 
not establishing causality. 
In a cross-country aggregate study, Zinnes, Eilat, and Sachs (2001) use a panel data 
set from 25 transition countries over a period 1990-1998. The dataset includes a series of 
indicators representing the components of the depth of privatization and progress in 
transition. They find that privatization does not by itself increase GDP growth, but they 
suggest that a positive effect is present when privatization is accompanied by hard budget 
constraints and in-depth institutional reforms. 
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Bennett, Estrin and Urga (2007) focus on privatization methods and use an expanded 
Solow-Barro empirical growth framework, in which GDP growth is associated with 
growth in factor inputs (capital, labor and human capital) and a number of other variables 
including capital market and private sector development. The authors use a panel data 
model and GMM estimation methods for almost all the transition economies (26 
countries) for the period from 1991 to 2003. They find that countries which used mass 
privatization enjoyed significantly higher growth post-privatization relative to pre-
privatization compared to countries which used other privatization methods. They use a 
variety if alternative specification as well as country specific fixed effects to control for 
possible alternative explanations of their finding. Their study suggests that, as predicted 
by policy advisors at the time, the advantage of speed in privatization brought about by 
mass privatization may have yielded benefits in terms of economic growth.9 Contrary to 
the expectations of many advisors and results of the early studies surveyed by Megginson 
(2005), however, the analysis of Bennett, Estrin and Urga (2007) suggests that mass 
privatization was superior to other privatization methods as far as the effect on growth is 
concerned. 
Using similar data, Gouret (2007) in turn provides complementary evidence showing 
that mass privatization resulted in a smaller positive effect on the level of GDP than the 
more gradual methods of privatization. Gouret also runs similar regressions as Bennett et 
al. (2007), using macroeconomic stabilization and reform dummy variables rather than 
inputs as controls. In these specifications he usually cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
effects of different forms of privatization on growth are not different from one another. 
Since in a number of economies pre-privatization firms were to a large extent 
controlled by workers, Albrecht and Thum (1994) discuss strategy for economies in 
transition to get through a potentially destabilizing phase. Based on their theoretical 
model they predict that policy measures such as labor participation with wage ceilings 
can help avoid the destructive trend towards mass bankruptcy with negative 
macroeconomic impact. 
 
                                                 
9 The result may be due to an increase in ownership concentration following mass privatization that had 
strengthened control over firms. 
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4. Micro Theory and Evidence 
A theoretical analysis and overview of privatization and firm performance in transition is 
provided by Roland (2000).10 Surveys of firm-level studies examining the effects of 
privatization on firm performance range from ones that find a large variation of outcomes 
but no systematically significant effect of privatization on performance (Bevan, Estrin 
and Schaffer, 1999) to those cautiously concluding that privatization improves firm 
performance (Megginson and Netter, 2001), to ones that are fairly confident that 
privatization tends to improve performance (Shirley and Walsh, 2001, and Djankov and 
Murrell, 2002). 
This variation in the interpretation of results is brought about in part by the fact that 
the early studies had access to different and often somewhat limited data on firm 
ownership. For these reasons, many studies treat ownership as a relatively simple 
categorical concept and some are often unable to distinguish the exact extent of 
ownership by individual owners or even relatively homogeneous groups of owners. 
Equally important, the diversity of interpretations and findings is generated by three types 
of interrelated analytical problems that may be expected in early studies in the context of 
the rapidly changing transition economies. First, the early studies rely on short time 
periods with observations concentrated immediately before and after privatization. 
Second, the early studies (a) use small and often unrepresentative samples of firms, (b) 
are frequently unable to identify accurately ownership because privatization is still 
ongoing or because the frequent post-privatization changes of ownership are hard to 
detect, and (c) often combine panel data from different accounting systems. Third, as we 
have discussed above, many of the early studies have not been able to control adequately 
for the selection/endogeneity problem of ownership and their estimates of the effects of 
privatization may hence be biased. 
In view of these problems, we have enlarged the survey of privatization studies 
reported by Djankov and Murrell (2002), hereafter D-M, with studies that have been 
published or circulated as working papers by November 2006, and we have taken into 
                                                 
10 In a broader framework the effect of privatization on firms’ performance falls within the ongoing debate 
in finance on the methodology of estimating the relationship between ownership and performance. See for 
instance Demsetz and Lehn (1985), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and 
Tsukanova (1996), and Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung (2005). 
 24
account pertinent information about the data and econometric techniques used by the 
various authors. The overlap between the studies of CEE and CIS that we evaluate and 
those covered by D-M is as follows: on total factor productivity we deal with 21 studies, 
D-M with 6 studies and we overlap on 4 studies; on labor productivity we cover 24 
studies, D-M 11 and we overlap on 9; on profitability we draw on 13 studies, D-M on 2 
and we overlap on 1; on sales and revenues we deal with 18 studies, D-M with 8 and we 
overlap on 3; on employment we draw on 18 studies, while D-M do not study the effect 
on this variable; on wages we evaluate 6 studies, D-M 2 and we overlap on 2; and on 
other measures of performance we deal with 34 studies; D-M with 15, and we overlap on 
5. Many studies have hence come on stream since the publication of the D-M paper. 
Moreover, some of the papers cited in D-M were working papers that came up with 
somewhat different estimates in the final published versions. 
Since the studies are heterogeneous with respect to their methodologies and the nature 
of the data used, we classify studies as belonging to category 1, 2 or 3, with category 1 
(C1) containing studies that employ at least fixed effects or use instrumental variables 
(IVs) to handle the selection/endogeneity problem in ownership and have a relatively 
large sample size (which we define as at least 200 firms in large and medium-sized 
countries, or at least 75 firms in small countries such as Slovenia), category 2 (C2) 
including studies that use fixed effects or IVs but work with smaller sample sizes than 
studies in C1, and category 3 (C3) having studies that use OLS with any sample size. In 
our evaluation, we place emphasis on studies in C1 and to a lesser extent C2. 
In assessing the effects of privatization, we examine the effects on total factor 
productivity or TFP (Table 2), labor productivity (Table 3), profitability (Table 4), sales 
and revenues – capturing the scale of operation (Table 5), employment (Table 6), wages 
(Table 7), and other indicators of performance (Table 8). In each table, we report studies 
from the countries of the former Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia and Albania in Panel A, while 
in Panel B we report for comparison the effects of studies dealing with China. 
4.1 Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
Productive efficiency, or total factor productivity, is of major interest since the 
communist economies collapsed in large part because of their increasing inability to 
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sustain innovation and technical progress. In particular, central planners were relatively 
capable of mobilizing labor and capital resources through compulsory full employment 
and high rates of investment, but they had hard time increasing the amount of output that 
SOEs generated from any given inputs. As a result, a major expectation during the 
transition has been that firms would increase their TFP. 
We have identified 22 studies that analyze the impact of ownership on TFP or rate of 
change of TFP in the transition economies, using value added, total product or sales 
revenues as the dependent variable and either dummy variables or percent share 
ownership as measures of different types of ownership. As may be seen from panel A of 
Table 2, 14 studies belong to C1, 3 to C2 and 5 to C3. A number of studies have simply 
examined the differential effect of state versus private ownership, while others examine 
the effects of other sub-categories of ownership. The studies cover both the CEE and CIS 
regions. 
With the possible exception of Russia, studies in C1 and C2 find the effect of private 
relative to state ownership to be positive or non-negative. Moreover, studies that break 
private ownership into several categories show that the overall private v. state ownership 
dichotomy subsumes different private ownership effects. Except for two of the three 
studies of Slovenia, all studies uniformly suggest that privatization to foreign owners 
increases efficiency. This effect of foreign ownership is strong and robust across regions. 
The effect of domestic private ownership is by and large also found positive in the CEE 
region and in Ukraine (Table 2), but it is quantitatively much smaller than that of foreign 
ownership (the quantitative effects are not shown in a tabular form). Russia appears to be 
different from Ukraine in that Sabirianova, Svejnar and Terrell (2005) and Brown, Earle 
and Telegdy (2006) find with large data sets the effect of domestic private and mixed 
ownership to be negative or insignificant. Similarly, Commander and Svejnar (2007) use 
a large firm-level data set from 26 transition economies and find an insignificant average 
(across countries) effect of domestic private ownership relative to that of the state 
ownership. In general, the effect of domestic private ownership appears to be more 
positive in the CEE region than in the CIS. 
Compared to the D-M survey that found the effect of private ownership to be positive 
in CEE but insignificant in CIS, we hence find a strong positive effect of foreign 
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ownership in both the CEE and CIS regions, and a quantitatively smaller positive effect 
of domestic private ownership in CEE and in Ukraine (together with a negative effect in 
Russia). The reason for finding a stronger positive effect than D-M is in part that we are 
focusing on studies in categories C1 and C2 that take into account the problem of 
selection/endogeneity of ownership, whereas the earlier surveys did not place as much 
emphasis on this issue. Indeed, the studies that we report in category C3 in Table 2 
generate much more diverse effects, with a number of the estimated OLS coefficients on 
private (domestic and foreign) ownership being negative or insignificant. Another reason 
for our stronger and more uniform findings of positive effects of private ownership may 
be that more of our studies cover recent years and privatization may take a few years to 
have an effect as strong owners take control and markets start to function. Finally, 
institutional development is a slow process and more recent data may pertain to a more 
developed legal and institutional setting in most of the transition economies. 
Several studies examine concentration of ownership and find that it plays an 
important part, with majority private ownership having mostly positive effects on TFP. 
The overall positive effect is again driven primarily by foreign owned firms. The effect of 
majority domestic private ownership tends to be positive as well, but it tends to be 
smaller in magnitude. As before, the effect is found to be positive in Ukraine but negative 
in Russia. Overall, we hence find qualified support for the hypothesis that concentrated 
private ownership tends to increase efficiency more than dispersed ownership. 
Two studies distinguish between privatized SOEs and newly created private firms. 
Sabirianova, Svejnar, and Terrell (2005) use 1992-2000 firm-level data for almost all 
industrial firms in the Czech Republic and Russia and find that foreign start-ups are less 
efficient than existing foreign owned firms, but more efficient than domestic start-ups, 
which are in turn more efficient than existing domestic firms. This study hence suggests 
that new firms tend to be more efficient than firms privatized to domestic owners. Using 
2002 and 2005 firm-level data from 26 transition economies, Commander and Svejnar 
(2007) find that domestic start up firms are less efficient than foreign owned firms but not 
significantly different from domestic privatized or state-owned firms. The two studies 
hence suggest that de novo firms are more productive than or at least as productive as 
SOEs privatized to domestic owners. 
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Studies that examine the dynamics of productive efficiency show that foreign-owned 
firms improved efficiency faster than domestic private and state-owned firms in the 
1990s and early 2000s. This differential effect is not detectable, however, in Commander 
and Svejnar’s (2007) study of the 2002-2005 panel data from the 26 transition economies. 
It is hence possible that foreign owners brought about a sizable increase in efficiency in 
the period immediately after acquiring the local firms in the 1990s, but that later on the 
rate of change in efficiency has been on average similar in all the principal types of 
ownership of firms. 
In view of the above results, the question naturally arises as to why the TFP effect of 
privatization to domestic owners has been much smaller than the TFP effect of 
privatization to foreign investors. Discussions with managers, policy makers and analysts 
suggest three leading possible explanations. The finding may reflect in part the limited 
skills and access to world markets on the part of the local managers. Domestically owned 
privatized firms are also the ones where performance-reducing activities such as looting, 
tunneling and defrauding of minority shareholders have been most frequent. Finally, in a 
number of countries the nature of the privatization process initially prevented large 
domestic private owners from obtaining 100% ownership stakes and insiders or the state 
often owned sizeable holdings. It often took these large shareholders several years to 
squeeze out minority shareholders and in the process the large shareholders sometimes 
artificially decreased the performance of their newly acquired firms in order to squeeze 
out the minority shareholders at low share prices. 
The existing privatization studies also provide information about the effect of 
employee (insider) ownership on efficiency. There has been a major debate about 
whether employee ownership and control are associated with lower or higher efficiency 
and excessive use of labor (labor hoarding).11 We have found seven studies that examine 
the effect of employee ownership on TFP. Six estimates from both CEE and CIS 
countries are statistically insignificant and one (Estonia) shows a positive effect of 
employee ownership on TFP. These results are different from those of D-M who find the 
overall effect of employee ownership on performance to be insignificant in CEE and 
negative in CIS. One reason for this discrepancy may be the aforementioned limited 
                                                 
11 In addition to our discussion above, see Hinds (1990), Earle and Estrin (1996), and Brada (1996). 
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overlap between our and D-M studies in this area. Moreover, D-M report that “the results 
for managers and workers show a considerable degree of sensitivity to how selection bias 
is handled”, while we focus on studies that handle the issue of selection (categories C1 
and C2). Finally, D-M recalculate some estimates (e.g., in their Table 1) for the sake of 
comparability across studies, while we present the effects as reported in the original 
studies. 
Simoneti, Damijan, Rojec, and Majcen (2005) use Slovenian data to test for the effect 
of a firm being listed or not listed on a stock exchange, relative to being government 
controlled. They find that the TFP effect of being listed is positive, while being privately 
controlled and non-listed has no significant effect relative to state control. This study 
hence supports the hypothesis that listing induces monitoring, better corporate 
governance and superior performance. 
As mentioned in the introduction, we have also surveyed the ownership-related 
studies that have been carried out on data from China. Probably because privatization is a 
relatively recent phenomenon in China, a number of studies, including Jefferson and 
Rawski (1996), address TFP issues with firm level data but do not examine differences in 
TFP related to privatization or ownership. As may be seen from Panel B of Table 2, 
studies that address these issues find diverse results, with the effect of non-state 
ownership being mostly positive but sometimes statistically insignificant and sometimes 
negative. Thus Jefferson and Su (2006) use a large sample of firms (N > 20,000) and 
show that the effect of private joint stock ownership on the level of TFP is positive. Hu, 
Song, and Zhang (2004) in turn use a much smaller sample of firms in selected regions 
(N > 700) and find the effects of cooperative as well as domestic and foreign private 
ownership to have a positive effect on the level of productivity. Yusuf, Nabeshima, and 
Perkins (2006) use a relatively large sample of firms (N > 4,000) and find the effect of 
domestic private, collective and complete foreign ownership on the level of productivity 
to be statistically insignificant, the effect of foreign joint ventures to be positive, 
unreformed state ownership negative, and reformed state ownership positive. Finally, 
Dong, Putterman, and Unel (2006) use firm-level data from Nanjing (N = 165) to 
examine the effect on the rate of change of TFP, and they find the effect of state urban 
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ownership to be positive, while the effect of state rural and both private urban and private 
rural ownership is found to be insignificant. 
The TFP studies of CEE, CIS and China, hence generate a variety of results. The CEE 
and CIS results suggest that privatization to foreign owners rather than domestic ones 
raises efficiency relative to state owned firms. In China, this result is less clear cut and 
relatively more estimates suggest that private domestic ownership raises TFP, though not 
the rate of change of TFP. Similarly, concentrated (especially foreign) private ownership 
has a stronger positive effect than dispersed ownership in CEE and CIS, but foreign joint 
ventures rather than wholly owned foreign firms have a positive effect on TFP level in 
China. Worker ownership in CEE and CIS (collective ownership in China) does not seem 
to have a negative effect relative to other forms of private ownership. Finally, data from 
CEE and CIS suggest that new firms appear to be equally or more efficient than firms 
privatized to domestic owners and foreign start-ups appear to be more efficient than 
domestic ones. 
4.2 Labor Productivity 
Estimates of the effect of ownership on labor productivity (not controlling for the use of 
others inputs) are based on twenty four studies, with 8 belonging to category C1 and 6 to 
category C2. The results of these studies have a less clear-cut interpretation since 
differences across types of firms could be due to different efficiency or simply to 
different non-labor (especially capital) factor intensity. 
As may be seen from Table 3, the findings of C1 and C2 studies are similar to the 
TFP results in that they suggest that the effect of private ownership is primarily positive 
or insignificant. Similarly, as in the case of TFP, foreign ownership and concentrated 
ownership are found to have a positive or insignificant effect, while the effects of 
employee and management ownership are estimated to be mostly statistically 
insignificant.  Finally, newly established firms are found to have lower labor productivity 
than others in some studies but not in others, but this may be brought about by a scale 
effect. Using the population of large and medium sized firms in the Czech Republic, 
Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar (2007) find that ownership by domestic industrial 
companies and investment funds generates lower labor productivity than all other types 
of ownership (including state) and that ownership by foreign industrial companies has a 
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positive productivity effect. Government retention of a golden share (veto power over 
certain key decisions) appears to have an insignificant effect. 
The corresponding studies of firms in China, reported in Panel B of Table 3, yield 
mostly insignificant estimates of the effects of private/non-state ownership on labor 
productivity, with only one estimate being positive. Among studies that belong to 
Category C1 and C2, Song and Yao’s (2004) study is based on the largest data set (N = 
3290) and finds the effect of private ownership and control to be insignificant, as does 
Dong, Putterman, and Unel (2006) using relatively small data set (165 firms), Li and 
Rozelle (2004) who find labor productivity to be unaffected by government’s share of 
ownership, and Sun and Tong (2003) who find no effect of state being a co-owner or a 
full owner. Only Hu, Song, and Zhang (2004) find a positive effect of domestic private 
ownership, but not of foreign or collective private ownership in an IV framework applied 
to a sample of 736 firms. The insignificant effects are surprising because the stylized 
facts and the theories developed on the basis of these facts (e.g., Gordon and Li, 1999) 
portray the private sector as being more productive and paying higher wages than the 
state sector. 
Overall, the effects of all types of private ownership on labor productivity (not 
controlling for non-labor inputs) are found to be positive or insignificant in CEE and CIS, 
and mostly insignificant in China. 
4.3 Profitability 
Profitability can be a very important indicator of company performance, although in the 
transition economies, as in many other developing countries, profits may be 
underreported by firms to evade taxes, and may reflect market power as well as technical 
efficiency. As may be seen from Panel A of Table 4, the effects of ownership on 
profitability or rate of change of profitability have been examined in thirteen studies, 6 of 
which belong to category C1, and 4 to C2. Most studies use data from the Czech 
Republic and Ukraine, but some use data from Belarus, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, and 
Russia. 
Foreign ownership tends to have a positive or insignificant effect on the level of 
profit, while the few studies that look at the effect of foreign ownership on the rate of 
change of profitability find it to be insignificant. The effect of domestic private 
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ownership is also for the most part positive or insignificant. The effect varies across types 
of ownership (bank, investment fund, individual, etc.), with the positive effects in the 
case of foreign owners being brought about by industrial (non-financial) companies as 
owners, while in the case of domestic owners it is usually some form of financial 
ownership that generates positive effects on profit. In this finer categorization, however, 
the effects vary across studies. Interestingly, using data from the Czech Republic, Weiss 
and Nikitin (2002) find a positive effect of national (state) ownership on the rate of 
change of both operating profit per worker and operating profit per unit of capital, as well 
as a positive effect of municipal ownership on the rate of change of operating profit per 
worker. Using data of the publicly traded firms in the Czech Republic during 1993-1995, 
Hanousek and Kočenda (2003) in turn find a positive effect of foreign majority 
ownership on the rate of change in returns on assets. Finally, Hanousek, Kočenda, and 
Svejnar (2007) find positive effect of the subsequent ownership by banks on change in 
ROA but this effect is offset by negative effect of change in ownership. Foreign industrial 
owners exhibit positive effect of initial ownership on profit over sales, while effect of 
subsequent ownership by others foreign owners is negative. Overall, profitability is not 
significantly affected by the state keeping a golden share. 
Three studies in categories C1 and C2 look at ownership concentration. In the Czech 
Republic, Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar (2007) find no effect of concentration that 
results from the initial large scale privatization, but they find a positive effect of majority 
ownership by domestic private owners as a result of ownership changes that took place 
after privatization. In terms of foreign ownership, the authors do not find any effect of 
high (majority) concentration among foreign owners, but do find that strong (blocking) 
minority (33-49%) foreign ownership has a positive effect on return on assets. Miller 
(2006) finds the effect of concentrated ownership on return on assets to be positive in 
Bulgaria, while Simoneti and Gregoric (2004) find concentrated management (but not 
employees) ownership to have a positive effect on profit/sales in Slovenia.  Hence, 
concentrated domestic private ownership, managerial ownership, and to a lesser extent 
foreign ownership tend to have a positive effect on profitability, while state keeping a 
golden share or concentration of worker ownership appear to be unrelated to profitability. 
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Studies of the effects of ownership on profit of firms in China vary considerably in 
terms of their methodology, sample size and findings (see Panel B of Table 4). Among 
the studies in Category 1 and 2, Jefferson and Su (2006) use their large sample of firms 
(N > 20,000) to find the effect of private ownership on profit/sales to be positive but 
significant only at the 10% test level. Dong, Putterman, and Unel (2006) find in their 
small data set from Nanjing (N = 165) that the effect of state urban and private rural 
ownership is positive, while that of state rural and private urban ownership is negative. 
Sun and Tong (2003) use a relatively small 1994-98 panel data set of listed firms (N = 
634) to examine the effect of ownership on three indicators of profitability. They find that 
(a) there is no difference in the effect of state, private domestic and private foreign 
ownership on EBIT/sales, (b) private domestic ownership has a positive effect, while 
state and private foreign ownership have no effect, on return on sales, and (c) private 
domestic and foreign ownerships have a positive while state has a negative effect on 
market/book value of the firm. 
Several studies of China examine ownership concentration, with Song and Yao 
(2004) finding with data from eleven cities (N = 3,290) that state and private majority 
ownership has a positive effect relative to non-majority state and private ownership, with 
the latter not being significantly different from one another. Tian and Estrin (2005) in 
turn use 1994-98 firm-level panel data (N = 2660) to find that state having small 
shareholding has the largest positive value on corporate value, followed by high state 
shareholding, while intermediate state shareholding has the lowest effect. Finally, Sun 
and Tong (2003) find that majority state or foreign ownership does not have a significant 
effect on the operating income/sales ratio. 
In CEE, CIS and China, the effect of private foreign and domestic ownership on 
profitability is hence found to be positive or statistically insignificant, with the 
significance depending on the particular type of ownership. Concentrated domestic 
private ownership, managerial ownership, and to a lesser extent foreign ownership 
generally tend to have a positive effect on profitability, while evidence from CEE also 
suggests that profitability is unaffected by when the state keeps a golden share or workers 
wield a more concentrated ownership. 
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4.4 Sales and Revenues 
Estimated effects of different types of ownership on sales or revenues (capturing the scale 
of operation) are reported in Table 5. The estimated coefficients are based on 20 studies, 
with 8 of them in category C1, and 6 in category C2. Some studies use sales and some the 
rate of change of sales as their dependent variable. Most of the C1 and C2 studies find 
private ownership to have a positive effect on the level of sales, suggesting that private 
ownership results in an increase in the scale of operations. Studies examining the effect 
of privatization on the rate of change of sales show that the effect is mostly insignificant 
but positive in the case of ownership by foreign industrial firm (Hanousek, Kočenda, and 
Svejnar, 2007) and ownership by outsiders and domestic as well as foreign financial 
firms (Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski, 1999; Frydman, Hessel, and 
Rapaczynski 2000). The effect is insignificant for ownership by insiders, domestic non-
financial firms, and domestic individuals. Studies in category 3 find both of the above 
effects to be statistically weaker and occasionally negative. 
Studies of China deal with the effect of ownership on the rate of change in sales or 
revenues per worker. The results are summarized in Panel B of Table 5. Using their 
Nanjing data, Dong, Putterman, and Unel (2006) find that the effects of state urban and 
state rural ownerships on the rate of change of revenues per worker are positive, while 
those of private urban and private rural ownership are statistically insignificant. These 
results suggest that state ownership results in a faster rate of increase of the scale of 
operation than private ownership. Jia, Sun, and Tong (2005) find the effect of state 
minority ownership on the change in real sales to be insignificant but do not report other 
categories of ownership and do not specify a base. On other hand, Sun and Tong (2003) 
estimate this effect to be negative for state majority ownership, insignificant for foreign 
majority ownership and positive for companies listed on the stock exchange. 
Overall, the studies of CEE and CIS countries indicate that privatization tends to have 
a positive effect on the scale of operation, while studies of the effect of private ownership 
on the rate of change of scale of operations (from CEE, CIS and China) suggest that this 
effect is not statistically significant except in some well defined categories of ownership. 
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4.5 Employment 
The effect of privatization on employment, like on revenues, is an indicator of the extent 
of restructuring brought about through privatization. As such, it provides an important 
empirical link to the theoretical models of transition. 
Seventeen studies have examined the effect of ownership on employment or rate of 
change of employment, with thirteen of them belonging to categories C1 or C2. As may 
be seen from Panel A of Table 6, there is a tendency for privatized firms, especially those 
with foreign owners, to increase or not to reduce employment relative to firms with state 
ownership, ceteris paribus. In the early-to-mid 1990s, when employment was falling in 
many transition economies, this relationship amounted to a smaller or similar decline in 
employment in the privately owned, especially foreign owned, firms as in the SOEs. This 
is very different from the negative employment effect found in the Mexican privatized 
firms by LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999). An interesting result is a time pattern 
related to privatization and employment in Polish firms identified by Mickiewicz, Gerry, 
and Bishop (2005) who show no significant effect on employment in the first three years 
after privatization, a significant positive effect about 3-6 years after privatization, and no 
significant effect afterwards. 
In general, employee ownership and control do not have a significant effect on 
employment, providing parallel evidence to the TFP studies that this form of ownership 
does not result in excess employment. 
Using a large 1980-90 sample of firms in China, Lane, Broadman, and Singh (1998) 
find a negative effect of the state and collective ownership on both job creation and job 
destruction (Panel B of Table 6) but no control group is presented. The effect on job 
destruction appears to be marginally larger than that of the job creation but the authors 
did not formally test for a difference between the two effects. In a C3 paper, Wei, Varela, 
D’Souza, and Hassan (2003) examine the effect of state and private foreign ownership in 
newly privatized firms on the change in employment over the 1990-1997 period. They 
find that state ownership has a negative employment effect, while the effect in the case of 
newly privatized firms with foreign ownership is insignificant. 
The studies of employment hence find that privatization in the post-communist 
economies and China is not associated with a reduction in employment, a phenomenon 
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that is assumed in many theoretical models and which was documented in some 
developing countries (e.g., Mexico). On the contrary, private owners tend to keep 
employment at higher levels than SOEs, ceteris paribus. 
4.6 Wages 
Studies of the effects of ownership on wages (3 in category C1 and 2 in category C3) find 
that state ownership is associated with lower wages in some countries, such as Russia and 
former Czechoslovakia, but not in others, such as Poland (see Table 7). Munich, Svejnar 
and Terrell’s (2005) study of the rate of return to human capital in the Czech Republic 
suggests that there is no significant difference in the rate of return on an additional year 
of education between state-owned, privatized and newly established private firms, but 
that private firms reward university education more than SOEs. Private firms also tend to 
have steeper and more concave experience-earnings profiles – paying higher returns on a 
year of experience to employees with low experience (recent entrants into the labor 
market) and lower returns to the more experienced (older) workers. 
In Russia, where in the 1990s firms tended to owe wages to their workers, SOEs were 
more likely to exhibit wage arrears than firms with domestic and foreign private 
ownership, firms with mixed ownership and de novo firms (Earle and Sabirianova, 2002, 
Lehmann, Wadsworth, and Acquisti, 1999). Hence, during this period private ownership 
was associated with a greater adherence to labor contracts than state ownership.12 
4.7 Other Indicators of Performance 
At least 35 studies have analyzed the effect of ownership on other dependent variables (8 
in category C1 and 11 in category C2; Table 8). The following patterns of private 
ownership effects seem to be broadly supported by the data: (a) private ownership tends 
to result in higher exports and greater efficiency, as measured by the cost of inputs 
relative to sales, Tobin’s Q, and soft budget constraints, (b) foreign firms tend to 
restructure and sell assets more than others (Djankov, 1999b), are more likely to pay 
dividends (Bena and Hanousek, 2006), and are less likely to default on debt (Frydman, 
Hessel, and Rapaczynski, 2000). Despite the fact that the broad range of indicators used 
in the studies precludes a unified summary, the results exhibit a pattern that is in line 
shown by other indicators. 
                                                 
12 We did not find studies comparing wage effects of different types of ownership in China. 
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5. Concluding Observations 
The transformation of the former communist countries from almost completely state-
owned to mostly privately-owned economies is one of the more fundamental events in 
recent economic history. Given the relatively poor performance of the centrally planned 
economies before the transition, most policy makers expected privatization to result in 
improved economic performance. As it turned out, the post-communist countries went 
through a deep recession in the first three to eight years of the transition, a period that 
usually coincided with the launch of privatization. Yet, they have been among the fastest 
growing economies in the last ten to fifteen years. There is some preliminary evidence 
that these phenomena may be related. 
The effects of privatization on performance at the micro-economic level is on the 
whole positive, but not uniformly so. The fact that firms have not been assigned for 
privatization at random also makes unbiased econometric inference difficult. Better firms 
seem to have been assigned for privatization first, thus making it likely that OLS 
estimates comparing the performance of privatized and non-privatized firms overestimate 
the positive effect of privatization. There is relatively clear evidence that privatization to 
foreign owners raises efficiency relative to that of state-owned firms, although in China 
this result is less clear-cut and relatively more estimates suggest that private domestic 
ownership raises TFP.13 The effect of domestic private ownership is by and large also 
positive in the CEE region and in Ukraine, but it is quantitatively much smaller than that 
of foreign ownership. Russia (and possibly other CIS countries that have not been 
rigorously analyzed) is different in that the performance effect of privatization to 
domestic owners is found to be negative or insignificant. 
In addition, concentrated (especially foreign) private ownership has a stronger 
positive effect on performance than dispersed ownership in CEE and CIS, but foreign 
joint ventures rather than wholly owned foreign firms have a positive effect on TFP level 
in China. Worker ownership in CEE and CIS (collective ownership in China) does not 
seem to have a negative effect and data from CEE and CIS suggest that new firms are 
equally or more productively efficient than firms privatized to domestic owners and 
                                                 
13 The absence of studies in category C1 for China, may explain why the results are less clear-cut. 
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foreign start-ups appear to be more efficient than domestic ones. Many studies have 
examined the effect of privatization on other indicators and they yield results that are 
broadly in line with the findings on TFP. 
The results highlight the importance of good management and corporate governance, 
access to world markets, and the presence of a functioning legal and institutional 
framework. For the former state owned firms, this restructuring is most easily and 
effectively achieved by foreign ownership. Foreign firms routinely bring in capable 
expatriate managers and invest heavily in training local managers. They sell the products 
through their global distributional networks, introduce a relatively advanced system of 
corporate governance and stress the importance of business ethics. Corporate governance 
of foreign firms hence compensates to a considerable extent for the underdeveloped legal 
and institutional system in many transition economies. While some domestic firms have 
also developed good corporate governance, the underdeveloped legal system has allowed 
local managers (or block shareholders) in many privatized firms to maximize their own 
benefits at the expense of corporate performance and hence welfare of (other) 
shareholders as well as stakeholders such as workers and government treasury. This is 
likely to account for the limited positive performance effects of privatization to domestic 
private owners as compared to the performance of firms privatized to foreign investors. 
Interestingly, in China the constraints on foreign firms together with a relatively 
functioning legal system have diminished the difference between the performance of 
private domestic and foreign firms, and made domestic-foreign joint ventures the most 
productive form of corporate ownership. 
The most important policy implication of our survey is that privatization per se does 
not guarantee improved performance, at least not in the short run.  Type of private 
ownership, corporate governance, access to know-how and markets, and the legal and 
institutional system matter for restructuring and performance. Foreign ownership tends to 
have a positive effect on performance. The positive effect of privatization to domestic 
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TABLE 1: PRIVATE SECTOR SHARE OF GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Czech Republic 10 15 30 45 65 70 75 75 75 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Hungary 25 30 40 50 55 60 70 75 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Poland 30 40 45 50 55 60 60 65 65 65 70 75 75 75 75 75 75
Slovak Republic 10 15 30 45 55 60 70 75 75 75 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Slovenia 15 20 30 40 45 50 55 60 60 60 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
Estonia 10 10 25 40 55 65 70 70 70 75 75 75 80 80 80 80 80
Latvia 10 10 25 30 40 55 60 60 65 65 65 65 70 70 70 70 70
Lithuania 10 10 20 35 60 65 70 70 70 70 70 70 75 75 75 75 75
Bulgaria 10 20 25 35 40 50 55 60 65 70 70 70 70 75 75 75 75
Romania 15 25 25 35 40 45 55 60 60 60 60 65 65 65 70 70 70
Russia 5 5 25 40 50 55 60 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 65 65
Ukraine 10 10 10 15 40 45 50 55 55 55 60 60 65 65 65 65 65
TABLE 2: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
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1 Andreyeva (2003) Ukraine; 1996-2000; N = 3 909 or 3 497 log (TP)
TABLE 2: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY




Private Limited Liab. Negative*
Private N/S
Private For. N/S






























Insider Blk. Min. N/S
Insider Maj. N/S
1 Sabirianova, Svejnar, and Terrell (2005)
Czech Republic; 
1992-2000; N = 19 971 VA
Russia; 
1992-2000; N = 26 286 VA
1 Smith, Cin, and Vodopivec (1997)
Slovenia; 
1989-1992; N = 3 729 log(VA)
2 Simoneti, Gregoric (2004) Slovenia; 1995-1999; N = 182 %∆ in log(TP)
Poland; 
1991-1998; N = 493 %∆ in log(TP)
1 Orazem and Vodopivec (2004)
Slovenia; 
1994-2001; N = 27 949 log (TP)
2 Grosfeld and Tressel (2002)
1 Simoneti, Damijan, Rojec, Majcen (2005)
Slovenia; 
1994-2001; N = 479 growth TFP
1 Pivovarsky (2003) Ukraine; 1998; N = 361 TFT estimate
TABLE 2: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY













Private For. Maj. Negative**
Private Dom. Maj. Fin. Negative***
Private Negative***
State N/S
3 Dobrinsky, Dochev, Mashiah, Markov (2001)
Bulgaria; 
1994-1996; N = 7 786 log(VA) State Negative***
3 Dobrinsky, Nikolov, Markov (2001)
Bulgaria; 










Private Dom. Positive***, N/S
Mngmnt. N/S
Worker Positive*, N/S
3 Jones and Mygind (2000)
Lithuania; 
1994 and 1995; N = 295+318 log(VA)
Latvia; 
1994 and 1995; N = 128+132 log (VA)
Estonia; 
1994 and 1995; N = 620+511 log (VA)
3 Cull, Matesova and Shirley (2002)
Czech Republic; 
1993-1996; N = 624 %∆ in TP
2
Weiss and Nikitin (2002) 
(1998 version available 
only)
Czech Republic; 
1993-1996; N = 746 %∆ in VA/K
TABLE 2: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY




Private 1st year Negative**
Private 2nd year Positive**

















VA/K Private Joint Stock Positive***




Private For. Joint Venture Positive***
Private For. Pure foreign-owned Positive***
3 Li and Wu (2002) Jilin, Jiangsu, Shanxi, Sichuan; 1980-1994; N = 4 414 Log(TP) State
Ownership 
fraction Positive***
Yr. Private = Year privatized; Sub. Yrs. = Subsequent years; Local = Local government control
Urban = Urban firms; Rural = Rural firms; Joint = joint venture or joint stock companies; Coop. = Cooperative
Dom. = Domestic ownershp; For. = Foreign ownership; Maj. = Majority control; Min. = Minority control; Blk. Min. = Blocking minority control
Fin. = Financial; Industrial=Ownership by Industrial firm; Mixed = Mixed ownership; Outsider = Outsider ownership; Insider = Insider Ownership;
List. = Listed; Non-List. = Non-Listed; Small = Small firms; Med. & Lrg. = Medium & Large firms; De Novo = New firms 
log(Output)
*** = statistical significance at 1% level; ** = statistical significance at 5% level; * = statistical significance at 10% level; 
N/S = insignificant effect; Positive/Negative = positive/negative effect
Private = Private ownership; State = State ownership; Worker = Worker ownership; Mngmnt. = Manager ownership
2 Jefferson and Su (2006) 1995 & 2001; N = 20 749




2 Hu, Song, Zhang (2004)
Beijing, Chongqing, 
Guangzhou, Shanghai, Wuhan; 
1996-2001; N = 736
TFP
2 Dong, Putterman and Unel (2006)
Nanjing metropolitan area; 
1994-2001; N = 165
3 Pohl, Anderson, Claessens, and Djankov (1997)
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, Slovakia; 
1992-1995, N = 6 354
%∆ in TP
TABLE 3: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON LABOR PRODUCTIVITY




Private Fin. (bank) N/S
Private Fin. (non-bank) Positive***
Private Dom. Fin. N/S
Private For. Fin. N/S
Private Maj. Fin. N/S
Private 1st phase Positive***
Private In 1994 N/S




1 Grigorian (2000) Lithuania; 1995-1997; N = 618 log (SR/L) Private Positive***
Private Dom. Industrial Negative*
Private Dom. Fin. (non-bank) Negative***
Private Dom. Individual N/S
Private For. Industrial Positive***
Private For. Others N/S
State Golden Share Positive***
1 Konings and Walsh (1999) Ukraine; 1997; N=258 Productivity Private De Novo Positive**
State Blk. Min. N/S
State Maj. N/S
Private Maj. N/S
Private For. Maj. Positive***
Private Dom. Maj. N/S
1 Perevalov, Gimadii, and Dobrodey (2000)
Russia; 





2 Djankov (1999a) Georgia, Moldova; 1995-1997; N = 241 SR/L
2 Carlin, Fries, Schaffer, Seabright (2001)
25 transition countries; 
1996-1998; N = 2 245 %∆ in TP/L
1 Pivovarsky (2001) Ukraine; 1998; N = 361-374 SR/L
1 Hanousek, Kocenda, and Svejnar (2007) 
Czech Republic; 
1996-1999; N = 2 949
%∆ in Labor 
Cost
1 Earle and Telegdy (2002) Romania; 1992-1997; N=14,532 SR/L
1 Claessens and Djankov (2002)
7 East European countries; 
1992-1995; N = 6 354 %∆ in SR/L
Ownership
1 Claessens and Djankov (1999)
Czech Republic; 
1992-1997; N = 2 860 VA/L
TABLE 3: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON LABOR PRODUCTIVITY


















Private For. Fin. N/S
Private Dummy N/S
Private Outsider Positive**
Private Insider ownership N/S
Private For. Fin. N/S
Private Dom. Fin. Positive**
Private Dom. N/S








Private Dom. Industrial N/S
Private For. Industrial N/S
2
Weiss and Nikitin (2002) 
(1998 version available 
only)
Czech Republic; 
1993-1996; N = 697 SR/L
2 Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999)
Hungary, Poland, Czech 
Republic; 
1990-1993; N = 466
Revenues/L
2 Earle (1998) Russia; 1994; N = 150-157 log (SR/L)
TABLE 3: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON LABOR PRODUCTIVITY






Private Maj. Insider N/S




Private Dom. Outsider N/S
Private For. Positive**
Private Insider ownership Positive**




State Blk. Min. N/S





Private Dom. Outsider N/S





3 Earle and Estrin (2003) Russia; 1994; N = 119 log (SR/L) Private Positive**
3 Earle and Estrin (1997) Russia; 1990-1994; N = 98-155 log (SR/L)
3 Djankov (1999b)
Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz, Russia, Ukraine; 
1995-1997; N = 960
%∆ in SR/L
3 Dean and Andreyeva (2001)
Ukraine; 
1995-1998; N = 190 log(∆ labor P)
3 Bakanova, Estrin, Pelipas and Pukovic (2006)
Belarus; 
2004; N = 402 S/Worker
3 Akimova and Schwödiauer (2004)
Ukraine; 
1998-2000; N = 202 S/Worker
3 Akimova and Schwödiauer (2000) 
Ukraine; 
1993-1997; N = 164-173 or 56 %∆ in SR/L
TABLE 3: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON LABOR PRODUCTIVITY































employees State Mixed N/S
Real sales/ 
Employees State Mixed N/S
Real net profir/ 
Employees State Mixed N/S
Real EBIT/ 
Employees State Mixed N/S
2 Sun and Tong (2003) 1994-1998; N = 634
2 Hu, Song and Zhang (2004)
Beijing, Chongqing, 
Guangzhou, Shanghai, Wuhan; 
1996-2001; N = 736
VA/Worker
1 Song and Yao (2004) 11 cities: 1995-2001; N = 3 290 Productivity
3 Linz (2000) Russia; 1992 and 1995; N=18,029 log (TP/L)
3 Linz and Krueger (1998) Russia; 1994-1997; N=119-269 TP/L
3 Jones (1998) Russia; 1992-1996; N = 94 %∆ in SR/L
TABLE 3: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON LABOR PRODUCTIVITY




Private For. Ownership share N/S
State Ownership share Negative***
State Reformed Joint Venture Positive***
State Reformed Limited Liab. Positive***
Private For. Joint Venture Positive***
Private N/S
Collective N/S
Private For. Wholly foreign-owned N/S
Private Positive**
Private Pre-privatization N/S
Private Premium paying Positive***
Private Mod. Disct. N/S















3 Li and Rozelle (2003) Jiangsu, Zhejiang; 1993-1999; N = 552 VA/Worker
2 Yusuf, Nabeshima and Perkins (2006) 1996-2001; N = 3 577
Private = Private ownership; State = State ownership; Worker = Worker ownership; Mngmnt. = Manager ownership
Dom. = Domestic ownershp; For. = Foreign ownership; Maj. = Majority control; Min. = Minority control; Blk. Min. = Blocking minority control
Pre = Preprivatization; Post = Postprivatization; Prem. = Premium paying; 
Mod. Disct. = Moderately discounted; Heav. Disct. = Heavily discounted
List. = Listed; Non-List. = Non-Listed; Small = Small firms; Med. & Lrg. = Medium & Large firms; De Novo = New firms 
Yr. Private = Year privatized; Sub. Yrs. = Subsequent years; Local = Local government control
Urban = Urban firms; Rural = Rural firms; Joint = joint venture or joint stock companies; Coop. = Cooperative
Fin. = Financial; Industrial=Ownership by Industrial firm; Mixed = Mixed ownership; Outsider = Outsider ownership; Insider = Insider Ownership;
*** = statistical significance at 1% level; ** = statistical significance at 5% level; * = statistical significance at 10% level; 
N/S = insignificant effect; Positive/Negative = positive/negative effect
TABLE 4: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON PROFITABILITY




Private Maj. Fin. N/S
Private 1st phase N/S
Private Fin. (Bank Sponsored) N/S
Private Fin. Positive***
Private Dom. Fin. Positive***
Private For. Fin. Positive***
Private Fin. N/S
Private Dom. Fin. Positive*
Private Fin. N/S
State N/S
Private For. Fin. N/S






Private Dom. ∆Ownership - Fin. (Bank) Negative***
Private Dom. Individual N/S
Private For. Industrial N/S
Private For. Blk. Min. Subsequent Ownership Positive*
Private For. Others N/S
State Golden Share N/S
Private Dom. Industrial N/S
Private Dom. Subsequent - Fin.(Bank) Positive*











State Golden Share N/S
1 Claessens, Djankov and Pohl (1997)
Czech Republic; 
1992-1995; N = 2 490 Profit
1 Hanousek, Kocenda, and Svejnar (2007)
Czech Republic; 





1 Claessens and Djankov (1999)
Czech Republic; 
1992-1997; N = 2 860 Profitability
TABLE 4: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON PROFITABILITY




1 Hanousek and Kocenda (2003)
Czech Republic; 
1993-1995; N = 1 348 %∆ in ROA Private For. Maj. Positive**
1 Perevalov, Gimadii, and Dobrodey (2000)
Russia; 
1992-1996; N = 945 Profit margin Private N/S
Private N/S
Private De Novo N/S
State Maj. Positive***
State Blk. Min. Positive**
Private Maj. Positive**
Private Blk. Min. N/S
Private For. Positive*
Labor Positive**
Private Maj. Fin. Positive**
Private Blk. Min. Fin. Positive***
Private Min. Hgh. Disp. N/S















Insider Blk. Min. N/S
Insider Maj. N/S
2 Simoneti, Gregoric (2004) Slovenia; 1995-1999; N = 182
EBITDA/     
Sales
2 Miller (2006) Bulgaria; 1996-2003; N = 5 360-5 964 ROA
1 Warzynski (2003) Ukraine; 1989-1997; N = 238
%∆ in 
Profitability
TABLE 4: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON PROFITABILITY








Private Dom. Industrial Positive***







Private Dom. Industrial Positive*,***
Private For. Industrial Positive**
Private Industrial N/S
Private Fin. N/S
2 Zalduendo (2003) FYR Macedonia; 1994, 1997 & 2000; N = 2 469 Profit/Sales Private Positive***
Private De Novo N/S
Private Min. N/S
Private Maj. Positive*
3 Estrin and Rosevear (1999) Ukraine; 1991-1997; N = 150 Profit Private N/S
UK; 1999; N = 411 Private Dom. Industrial N/S
Poland; 1999; N = 87 Private Dom. Industrial N/S
Czech Republic; 1999; N = 67 Private Dom. Industrial N/S
PANEL B





3 Lskavyan, Spatareanu (2006) ROA
2 Dong, Putterman and Unel (2006)
Nanjing metropolitan area; 
1994-2001; N = 165 Profit/Sales
3 Bakanova, Estrin, Pelipas and Pukovic (2006)
Belarus; 
2004; N = 402 Profit/Sales
2
Weiss and Nikitin (2002) 
(1998 version available 
only)
Czech Republic; 







TABLE 4: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON PROFITABILITY






Private Min. Legal Positive**




Private Min. Legal Positive**




Private Min. Legal Positive**




Private Min. Legal Positive**
Private Maj. Legal N/S
Private HongKong Positive**
State Negative**
Mixed Tradable Shares N/S





Private Dom. Listed N/S
Private For. Listed N/S
State Listed N/S
Private Dom. Listed Positive**
Private For. Listed N/S
State Maj. Listed Negative**
State Min. Listed Positive**





2 Song and Yao (2004) 11 cities: 1995-2001; N = 3 290
Pretax 
profit/Assets
2 Qi, Wu and Zhang (2000) 1991-1996; N = 774 ∆ ROE 






2 Jia, Sun, Tong (2005)
TABLE 4: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON PROFITABILITY











Private Premium paying Positive**
Private Mod. Disct. N/S















Private Joint Venture N/S
Private Mixed N/S
Private For. N/S
3 Wei, Varela and Hassan (2002) 1994; N = 1 029-1 031
Return on Sales
Return on total 
assets
3 Wei, Varela, D'Souza and Hassan (2003) 1990-1997; N = 1 664
%∆ return on 
sales
∆ real sales
3 Wang (2005) 1994-1999; N = 630 ∆ ROA
3 Li and Wu (2002) Jilin, Jiangsu, Shanxi, Sichuan; 1980-1994; N = 4 414
Deflated return 
on total assets
3 Li and Rozelle (2003) Jiangsu, Zhejiang; 1993-1999; N = 591 Profit rate
3 Chen, Firth and Rui (2006) 1991-2000; 1 078 Return on sales
2 Tian and Estrin (2005) 1994-1998; N = 2 660 ROA
TABLE 4: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON PROFITABILITY





Mixed Legal entity Positive***
Private Individual N/S
State Negative***
Mixed Legal entity Positive***
Private Individual N/S
3 Xu and Wang (1999) 1993-1995; N = 668
ROE
ROA
Yr. Private = Year privatized; Sub. Yrs. = Subsequent years; Shares = Shareholding; Local = Local government control; Municip. = Municipal control; 
Cent. = Central government control; Urban = Urban firms; Rural = Rural firms; Joint = joint venture or joint stock companies; 
Coop. = Cooperative; Pre = Preprivatization; Post = Postprivatization; Prem. = Premium paying;  
Mod. Disct. = Moderately discounted; Heav. Disct. = Heavily discounted; Legal = Legal persons
Fin. = Financial; Industrial=Ownership by Industrial firm; Mixed = Mixed ownership; Outsider = Outsider ownership; Insider = Insider Ownership;
List. = Listed; Non-List. = Non-Listed; Small = Small firms; Med. & Lrg. = Medium & Large firms; Natl. = National control; De Novo = New firms 
N/S = insignificant effect; Positive/Negative = positive/negative effect
Private = Private ownership; State = State ownership; Worker = Worker ownership; Mngmnt. = Manager ownership; Dom. = Domestic ownership; 
For. = Foreign ownership; Maj. = Majority control; Min. = Minority control; Sm. Min. = Small minority control; Blk. Min. = Blocking minority control
*** = statistical significance at 1% level; ** = statistical significance at 5% level; * = statistical significance at 10% level; 
TABLE 5: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON SALES OR REVENUES










Private In 1994 Negative*
Private In 1993 N/S
Private Pre-1992 Positive***
1 Grigorian (2000) Lithuania; 1995-1997; N = 618 log (Sales) Private Positive***

















Private For. Others N/S
State Golden Share N/S
1 Jones and Mygind (2002) Estonia; 1993-1997; N = 2 485 Sales Private Maj. Positive**
State Blk. Min. N/S
State Maj. N/S
Private Maj. Positive***
Private For. Maj. Positive**
Private Dom. Maj. Positive*
1 Perevalov, Gimadii, and Dobrodey (2000)
Russia; 
1992-1996; N = 945 %∆ in Sales Private N/S
1 Hanousek, Kocenda, and Svejnar (2007) 
Czech Republic; 
1996-1999; N = 2 592 %∆ in Sales
Ownership
1 Andreyeva (2003) Ukraine; 1996-2000; N = 3 497 or 3 909 log (Sales)
1
1 Pivovarsky (2001) Ukraine; 1998; N = 361 Sales
Claessens and Djankov 
(2002)
7 East European countries; 
1992-1995; N = 6 354 Sales
TABLE 5: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON SALES OR REVENUES




1 Salis (2006) Slovenian manufacturing firms; 1996-1999; N = 980 Log(Output) Private For. Acquisition Positive**
2 Angelucci, Estrin, Konings, Zolkiewski (2002) 
Poland; 






Private De Novo Positive**
2 Djankov and Hoekman (2000)
Czech Republic; 
1992-1997; N = 513 %∆ in Sales Private Dom. Joint venture N/S
Private Privatized effect dummy Positive**
Private Outsider Positive***
Private Insider N/S
Private For. Fin. Positive*
Private Dom. Fin. Positive***
Private Dom. Industrial N/S

























2 Frydman, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (2000)





2 Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999)
Hungary, Poland, Czech 
Republic; 
1990-1993; N = 513
%∆ in 
Revenues
Sales2 Carlin, Fries, Schaffer, Seabright (2001)
25 transition countries; 
1996-1998; N = 2 245
TABLE 5: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON SALES OR REVENUES







3 Batjargal (2000) Russia; 1995 & 1999; 56
%∆ in 
Revenues Private De Novo N/S
Private Insider N/S
Private State Control dummy Negative*
Private N/S
State N/S
Private For. Small Negative***
Private For. Med. & Lrg. Positive***
Private De Novo Negative**
Private Dummy N/S









3 Jones (1998) Russia; 1992-1996; N = 99 Revenues
3 Fries, Neven and Seabright (2002)
16 transition countries; 
1994-1999; N = 475 Revenues
3 Goud (2003) 25 CEE and FSU countries; 1999; N = 4 104 ∆ Sales
3 Bhaumik and Estrin (2005) Russia; 1997-1999; N = 550 ∆ log(Sales)
3 Bhaumik and Estrin (2003) Russia; 1997-1999; N = 275 %∆ in Sales
2 Maurel (2001) Hungary; 1992-1998; N = 30 719 log(Sales)
TABLE 5: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON SALES OR REVENUES









2 Jia, Sun, Tong (2005) 1993-2002; N = 530 ∆ in real sales State Min. N/S
State Maj. Negative*




3 Bhaumik and Estrin (2005) China; 1995-1999; N = 548-552 ∆ log(Sales)
2 Sun, Tong (2003) 1994-1998; N = 634 ∆ in real sales
Yr. Private = Year privatized; Sub. Yrs. = Subsequent years; Shares = Shareholding; Local = Local government control
Cent. = Central government control; Urban = Urban firms; Rural = Rural firms; Joint = joint venture or joint stock companies; 
Coop. = Cooperative; Pre = Preprivatization; Post = Postprivatization; Collect. = Collective; Prem. = Premium paying;  
Mod. Disct. = Moderately discounted; Heav. Disct. = Heavily discounted; Legal = Legal persons
Dom. = Domestic ownershp; For. = Foreign ownership; Maj. = Majority control; Min. = Minority control
Fin. = Financial; Industrial=Ownership by Industrial firm; Mixed = Mixed ownership; Outsider = Outsider ownership; Insider = Insider Ownership;
List. = Listed; Non-List. = Non-Listed; Small = Small firms; Med. & Lrg. = Medium & Large firms; De Novo = New firms 
*** = statistical significance at 1% level; ** = statistical significance at 5% level; * = statistical significance at 10% level; 
N/S = insignificant effect; Positive/Negative = positive/negative effect
Private = Private ownership; State = State ownership; Worker = Worker ownership; Mngmnt. = Manager ownership
2 Dong, Putterman and Unel (2006)
Nanjing metropolitan area- 
rural (owned by township 
governments) and urban 
enterprises (owned by central, 
provincial and municipal 
governments); 




TABLE 6: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON EMPLOYMENT












Private Emerging Private Firm N/S
Private Negative***
State Commercialized SOE N/S
Private Blk. Min. In 1994 N/S
Private Blk. Min. In 1993 N/S









Private For. Maj. Positive**
1 Perevalov, Gimadi, and Dobrodey (2000)
Russia; 
1992-1996; N = 945 L Private N/S
1 Salis (2006) Slovenian manufacturing firms; 1996-1999; N = 980
log 
(Employment) Private For. Acquisition N/S
1 Konings and Lehmann (2002) Russia; 1996-1997; N=3 500 Labor demand
1 Konings and Xavier (2003) Slovenia; 1994-1998; N = 2 656 %∆ in Labor
1 Claessens and Djankov (2002)
7 East European countries; 
1992-1995; N = 6 354 Emloyment
Ownership
1 Basu, Estrin and Svejnar (1997)
Czechoslovakia; 
1989-1993; N = 2 933 log (L)
Poland; 
1988-1991; N = 261 log (L)
TABLE 6: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON EMPLOYMENT





Non-State Municipal dummy N/S










Non-State Municipal dummy Positive**
















Private For. Fin. Positive**
Private Dom. Fin. N/S
Private Dom. Industrial N/S




2 Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999)
Hungary, Poland, Czech 
Republic; 
1990-1993; N = 493
%∆ in Labor
2 Domadenik, Prasnikar and Svejnar (2003)
Slovenia; 
1996-1998; N = 200
log (Labor 
adjustment)




TABLE 6: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON EMPLOYMENT










Private For. De Novo Positive**
Private Dom. De Novo N/S
Privatized 3-6yrs later Positive***
Privatized 7yrs and more N/S
2 Walsh and Whelan (2001)
Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, 
Slovenia; 
1990-1996; N = 938-1 003
%∆ in Labor Private Maj. De Novo Positive**
Private De Novo N/S
Private Min. N/S
Private Maj. Positive**; Positive**
Private Privatiz. dummy N/S
Private De Novo Positive**
Private Privatiz. dummy N/S
Private De Novo N/S
Private Privatiz. dummy N/S
Private De Novo Positive**
Private Small Positive***









2 Mickiewicz (2005) Poland; 1996-2002; N=1 911 ∆ Employment
3 Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer (1996)
Poland; 
1988-1991; N = 7 405 %∆ in Labor
3 Jones (1998) Russia; 1992-1996; N = 97 L
3 Goud (2003) 25 CEE and FSU countries; 1999; N = 4 104 ∆ in Labor
3 Bilsen and Konings (1998)
Bulgaria; 
1991-1994; N = 95 %∆ in Labor
Hungary; 
1991-1994; N = 76 %∆ in Labor
Romania; 
1991-1994; N = 85 %∆ in Labor
3 Bakanova, Estrin, Pelipas and Pukovic (2006)
Belarus; 
2004; N = 402
employment 
growth
2 Faggio and Konings (2003)
Poland; 1993-1997; N = 738 %∆ in Labor
Bulgaria; 1993-1997; N = 4 
679 %∆ in Labor
Romania; 1993-1997; 5 203 %∆ in Labor
TABLE 6: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON EMPLOYMENT











3 Wei, Varela, D'Souza and Hassan (2003) 1990-1997; N = 656
%∆ in 
employment
1 Lane, Broadman, Singh (1998)
not specified; 
1980-1990; N = 5 935 Job creation
not specified; 
1980-1990; N = 3 768 Job destruction
Yr. Private = Year privatized; Sub. Yrs. = Subsequent years; Shares = Shareholding; Local = Local government control
Cent. = Central government control; Urban = Urban firms; Rural = Rural firms; Joint = joint venture or joint stock companies; 
Coop. = Cooperative; Pre = Preprivatization; Post = Postprivatization; Prem. = Premium paying;  
Mod. Disct. = Moderately discounted; Heav. Disct. = Heavily discounted; Legal = Legal persons
Fin. = Financial; Industrial=Ownership by Industrial firm; Mixed = Mixed ownership; Outsider = Outsider ownership; Insider = Insider Ownership;
List. = Listed; Non-List. = Non-Listed; Small = Small firms; Med. & Lrg. = Medium & Large firms; De Novo = New firms 
*** = statistical significance at 1% level; ** = statistical significance at 5% level; * = statistical significance at 10% level; 
N/S = insignificant effect; Positive/Negative = positive/negative effect
Private = Private ownership; State = State ownership; Worker = Worker ownership; Mngmnt. = Manager ownership
Dom. = Domestic ownershp; For. = Foreign ownership; Maj. = Majority control; Min. = Minority control
TABLE 7: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON WAGES






















De Novo; Probit Negative***
De Novo; Tobit Negative***
1 Lehmann, Wadsworth, and Acquisti (1999)
Russia; 






List. = Listed; Non-List. = Non-Listed; Small = Small firms; Med. & Lrg. = Medium & Large firms; De Novo = New firms; Coop. = Cooperative
Private
3 Brainerd (2002) Russia; 1993-1998; N = 2 659 log (Wage)
Private = Private ownership; State = State ownership; Worker = Worker ownership; Mngmnt. = Manager ownership
Dom. = Domestic ownershp; For. = Foreign ownership; Maj. = Majority control; Min. = Minority control; Local = Local government control
Fin. = Financial; Industrial=Ownership by Industrial firm; Mixed = Mixed ownership; Outsider = Outsider ownership; Insider = Insider Ownership;
Ownership
1 Basu, Estrin and Svejnar (1997)
Czechoslovakia; 
1989-1993; N = 2 933 log (Wage)
Poland; 
1988-1991; N = 157 log (Wage)
*** = statistical significance at 1% level; ** = statistical significance at 5% level; * = statistical significance at 10% level; 
Private For.
N/S = insignificant effect; Positive/Negative = positive/negative effect
3 Grosfeld and Nivet (1999) Poland; 1988-1994; N = 412, 211 or 55 %∆ in Wages
Private
1 Earle and Sabirianova (2002)
Russia; 
1994-1996; N = 6 731-6 898 Wage arreas
Private Dom.
TABLE 8: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON OTHER INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE







Private Dom. Fin. N/S
Private Non-Bank Fund N/S
State N/S
Private For. Industrial (FDI) N/S

























1 Claessens, Djankov and Pohl (1997)
Czech Republic; 
1992-1995; N = 2 490 Tobin Q
Ownership
1 Hanousek, Kocenda, and Svejnar (2004)
Czech Republic; 








1 Kocenda (2003) Czech Republic; 1996-1999; N = 2 418
Total assets




1 Bena and Hanousek (2006) Czech Republic; 1996-2003; N = 5 437
Probability to 
pay dividends
TABLE 8: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON OTHER INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE




1 Perevalov, Gimadii, and Dobrodey (2000)
Russia; 
1992-1996; N = 945 Unit costs Private Negative*
State Blk. Min. N/S
State Maj. N/S
Private Maj. Negative***
Private For. Maj. Negative***
Private Dom. Maj. Negative*





Private Maj. Insider N/S
Private Maj. Outsider N/S
2 Csermely and Vincze (1999)
Hungary; 








Private Dom. Outsider N/S





Private Dom. Outsider N/S
Private For. Outsider Positive*
Private Individual N/S
2 Djankov (1999b)
Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz, Russia, Ukraine; 
1995-1997; N = 960
Asset sales
Renovation
2 Akimova and Schwödiauer (2000)
Ukraine; 





1998; N = 361-374 Input/ Revenues
1 Pivovarsky (2003) Ukraine; 1998; N = 361 Input/ Revenues
1 Pivovarsky (2001)
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Private Dom. Fin. N/S
Private Dom. Industrial N/S




2 Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999)
Hungary, Poland, Czech 
Republic; 
1990-1993; N = 347
%∆ 
Costs/Revenues
2 Fries, Neven and Seabright (2002)
16 transition countries; 
1994-1999; N = 1 725 Log(costs)
2 Everaert and Hildebrandt (2001)
Bulgaria; 




1995-1999; N = 6 646
Soft budget 
constraint
2 Earnhart and Lízal (2006) Czech Republic; 1993-1998; N = 1 127
Absolute 
environmental 
2 Domadenik, Prasnikar and Svejnar (2003)
Slovenia; 
1996-1998; N = 237
Investment in 
fixed assets
TABLE 8: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON OTHER INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE




State Bnk. Cred. Positive**
State Tax Auth. Positive**
State Positive**
Private Trade Cred. Negative**
State Maj. N/S
State Blk. Min. N/S
Private Maj. N/S
Private Blk. Min. N/S
Private For. N/S
Labor N/S
Private Maj. Fin. N/S
Private Blk. Min. Fin. N/S
Private Min. Hgh. Disp. Negative**
Private Min. Lw. Disp. N/S
Private Ex. Priv. N/S
Private Prev. Own. Negative**
Private Bypass Negative**
Private Ex. Priv. N/S
Private Prev. Own. N/S
Private Bypass N/S
Exports/Sales Private De Novo Positive*
%∆ Exports State Maj. N/S
%∆ Exports 
(West) Private Maj. N/S




3 Bakanova, Estrin, Pelipas and Pukovic (2006)
Belarus; 
2004; N = 402
3 Bojnec (1999) Slovenia; 1989-1996; N = 248-251
2 Prasnikar and Svejnar (1998)
Slovenia; 





2 Miller (2006) Bulgaria; 1996-2003; N = 5 360-5 964 Sales/Wages
2 Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (2000)
Hungary, Poland, Czech 
Republic; 
1990-1993; N = 53-75
Default on debt 
levels
TABLE 8: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON OTHER INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE





Private Dom. Maj. Positive***





Private Dom. Maj. N/S





Private Dom. Maj. N/S
Private For. Maj. N/S
Private Dom. Positive**
Private For. Positive***
Private For. Min. N/S
Private For. Maj. Joint Stock N/S
Private Maj. Joint Stock Negative***




Product Private Insider Positive**
Input Private Insider Positive***





3 Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman (2001)
Russia; 
1997; N = 328
Success in 
transactions Private Maj. Negative***
3 Jelic, Briston, Aussenegg (2003)
Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland; 






Grosfeld and Hashi (2007) Czech Republic, Poland; 1994-2000; N = 653
Ownership 
concentration
3 Djankov (1999a) Georgia, Moldova; 1995-1997; N = 241
3 Estrin and Rosevear (1999) Ukraine; 1991-1997; N = 150
3
3 Cull, Matesova and Shirley (2002)
Czech Republic; 
1993-1996; N = 1 017 ROA
3 Claessens (1997)
Czech and Slovak Republics; 
1992-1993; N = 1 198
log (Voucher 
price)
Czech and Slovak Republics; 




Czech and Slovak Republics; 
1992-1993; N = 589
log (Share 
price), OTC
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Private SLO Fin. Positive**
Private SLO Individual Positive**
Private For. Maj. N/S
Private Dom. Maj. N/S
Private For. Maj. N/S
Private Dom. Maj. N/S
Private Lease Negative***
Coop. N/S
Private Joint Stock Positive***
Russia; 1995; N = 216 Private N/S
Bulgaria; 1995; N = 221 Private N/S
Russia; 1995; N = 216 Private N/S
Bulgaria; 1995; N = 221 Private Positive**
Russia; 1995; N = 216 Private N/S
Bulgaria; 1995; N = 221 Private Positive**








3 Zinnes, Eilat and Sachs (2001)
24 transition countries; 
1989-1998; N = 173 GDP Private Positive***
3 Zemplinerova, Lastovicka, and Marcincin (1995) 
Czech Republic; 
1991-1993; N = 257
Restructuring 
index







3 Linz (1999) Russia; 1992 & 1995; N = 12-590
Depreciation 
rate
3 Konings, Van Cayseele and Warzynski (2005)
Bulgaria; 




1994-1998; N = 1 917
Price cost 
margin
3 Jones (1998) Russia; 1992-1996; N = 93 Costs
3 Warzynski (2003) Ukraine; 1989-1997; N = 295
Managerial 
turnover
TABLE 8: EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP ON OTHER INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE



























3 Jia, Sun, Tong (2005) 1993-2002; N = 530 Cash flow/total debt State N/S
Private Positive***
Private Pre-privatization N/S
Private Premium paying Positive***
Private Mod. Disct. Positive***
Private Heav. Disct. N/S













Long term debt/ 
Equity
2 Wei, Xie and Zhang (2005) 1991-2001; N = 5 284 Tobin Q
2 Tian and Estrin (2005) 1994-1998; N = 2 660 Tobin Q
2 Sun, Tong (2003) 1994-1998; N = 634 times-Interest 
earned
2 Song and Yao (2004) 11 cities; 1995-2001; N = 3 290 Unit costs
2 Qing Gong (2004) Liaoning; 1987-1996; N = 11 467
Efficiency 
Index
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Private Post; Prem. Positive***
Private Post; Mod. Disct. N/S
Private Post; Heav. Disct. N/S
Private Positive**
Private Pre; Prem. N/S
Private Pre; Mod. Disct. Positive***
Private Pre; Heav. Disct. N/S
Private Post; Prem. Positive***
Private Post; Mod. Disct. Positive***







Mixed Legal entity Positive***
Private Individual Negative***
Cent. = Central government control; Urban = Urban firms; Rural = Rural firms; Joint = joint venture or joint stock companies; 
Coop. = Cooperative; Pre = Preprivatization; Post = Postprivatization; Prem. = Premium paying;  
Mod. Disct. = Moderately discounted; Heav. Disct. = Heavily discounted; Legal = Legal persons
3 Xu and Wang (1999) 1993-1995; N = 673 Market/Book
3 Wei and Varela (2003) 1994-1996; N = 252 Tobin Q
3 Tian (2001) 1985-1997; N = 30 GDP growth






Hgh. Disp. = High dispersion; Lw. Disp. = Low dispersion
Blk. Min. = Blocking minority control; Joint Stock = Joint stock corporation; Voucher = Voucher privatization
Fin. = Financial; Industrial=Ownership by Industrial firm; Mixed = Mixed ownership; Outsider = Outsider ownership; Insider = Insider Ownership;
List. = Listed; Non-List. = Non-Listed; Small = Small firms; Med. & Lrg. = Medium & Large firms; De Novo = New firms 
Yr. Priv. = Year privatized; Sub. Yrs. = Subsequent years; Shares = Shareholding; Local = Local government control
*** = statistical significance at 1% level; ** = statistical significance at 5% level; * = statistical significance at 10% level; 
N/S = insignificant effect; Positive/Negative = positive/negative effect
Private = Private ownership; State = State ownership; Worker = Worker ownership; Mngmnt. = Manager ownership
Dom. = Domestic ownershp; For. = Foreign ownership; Maj. = Majority control; Min. = Minority control
